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RECONCILING THE DORMANT CONFLICT: CRAFTING A
BANKINO EXCEPTION TO THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
PROVISION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE FOR BANK
HOLDING COMPANY ASSET TRANSFERS
CASSANDRA JONES HA VARD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Banking law and bankruptcy law clash. This is most evident when a
bank holding company (parent company)' becomes insolvent after it has
made an asset transfer to its financially troubled bank subsidiary.3
The Bankruptcy Code (Code) governs the insolvency proceedings
of the bank holding company.' Predictably, the parent company's trustee,

* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Law School. B.A., 1978, Bennett College;
1.0., 1981, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Rick Greenstein
and Rafael Porrata-Doria on an earlier draft of this article, for the research assistance of Michael
Adler and Todd Winneck, and for the fmancial assistance of the Temple University School of Law.
1. A parent company or bank holding company is a "company which has control over any
bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company ... if the company directly or
indirectly owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum ... of any voting securities .... " 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(I)-(2) (1994). See generally Eric 1. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director's
Dilemma, 47 HAsTINGS L.1. 287 (1996) (stating the nonoperating parent company ownership of
operating subsidiaries is the norm in banking law, as well as in other industries).
2. "Asset transfer" is the bankruptcy reference describing the shifting of capital from a debtor
to a creditor. The term correlates to banking law's capital maintenance obligation when the parent
company making the transfer is insolvent or becomes insolvent as a result of the transfer. A parent
company that controls an undercapitalized bank subsidiary may implement a Capital Restoration
Plan (CRP), which sets forth how the parent company will recapitalize or basically infuse funds into
the bank subsidiary.
3. "Bank subsidiary" refers to federally insured depository institutions commonly called
banks and thrifts.
4. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.c. §§ 101-1330 (1994) (providing a priority scheme
designed to treat all creditors equally). See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952) ("The theme
of the Bankruptcy Act is 'equality of distribution' and if one claimant is to be preferred over others,
the purpose should be clear from the statute."); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945)
(explaining ratable distribution among creditors is one of bankruptcy law's primary purposes);
William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Inequality Among Creditors: The Unconstitutionality of
Successor Liability to Create a New Class of Priority Claimants, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 325,
347-49 (1996) (explaining that state successor liability claim, which operates to give certain
creditors a windfall over others, is also in direct conflict with well-established principles of federal
preemptions under the Code and extension of such liability should be left to Congress pursuant to its
exclusive jurisdiction on the issue of bankruptcy); Donald R. Korobkin, Contracturianism and the
Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REv. 541, 602 (1993) (stating that the policy
of equality flows from concern for "the welfare of unsecured creditors who lack influence" and
signifies a normative commitment to rational planning).
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appointed for the protection of all the creditors of the bankrupt entity /
uses the fraudulent conveyance provision of the Code to have any asset
transfers that were made to the bank subsidiary returned to the debtor's
estate.6 The good faith exception to that provision will protect the asset
transfer only if the parent company made the transfer for "good and fair
consideration. ,,7
The banking laws govern the regulation of the entire banking industry, including the insolvency of a fmancial institution.s The banking
laws, arguably, provide preferential treatmene for the Federal Deposit
5. S. REp. No. 95-989, at 49 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5835; H.R. REp.
No. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138.
6. Fraudulent conveyance law applies where the debtor receives less than reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the assets transferred or the obligations incurred, if the debtor was
or became insolvent, after giving effect to the transfer or obligation. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)
(1978). Under the traditional analysis, an insolvent bank subsidiary cannot exchange reasonably
equivalent value when its parent company makes an asset transfer. See discussion infra Part m.B.!.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) states that the Code also provides for avoidance of a transfer under
the preference provisions. Under that provision, the usual 90-day period is extended to one year for
an affiliate or insider, su,ch as a bank subsidiary. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2)(B), 101(31)(E) (1994).
Assuming that the elements of that section are met, a possible defense to a preference recovery is
that the transfer was made tn the ordinary course of business. See John C. Deal et al., Capital
Punishment: The Death of Limited Liability for Shareholders of Federally Regulated Financial
Institutions, 24 CAP. U. L. REv. 67,121 (1995) (arguing that the ordinary course of business defense
may fail given the amount of the transfers and presuming that the fmancial institution solvency
status is weakened continually over the one-year period).
The fraudulent conveyance provision is the focus of the proposed amendment because its
focus on the value of the exchange· between the debtor and the transferee correlates with the
enterprise liability theory, the premise of parent company liability. See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
7. See discussion infra Part II.B.!.
8. See generally Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (describing
the comprehensive framework that Congress has granted to the [bank regulators] as broad
discretionary powers to regulate the industry, and referring to the regulatory scheme as "cradle to ...
grave" regulation).
When a bank subsidiary fails, the regulatory scheme provides for the appointment of a
receiver for the orderly distribution of the financial institution's assets. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1994).
It is the financial institution's receiver that reviews the trustee's request to have the parent
company's assets returned to the parent company's estate. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.a.
regarding MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1990) affd in pan, rev'd in pan, 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (denying bank holding company's
application to the bankruptcy court for an automatic stay of the regulatory agency's administrative
proceedings upon filing of bankruptcy petition and fmding that the district court had no jurisdiction
over the claim because it was not ripe for judicial review until the conclusion of the administrative
proceedings).
9. Many courts have expressed dissatisfaction with the incongruence between the banking
insolvency laws and the bankruptcy laws, which seem to give the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) uncontrollable powers. See FDIC v. Continental Fin. Resources, Inc. (In re
Continental Financial Resources, Inc.), 154 B.R. 385,388 (0. Mass. 1993) (holding compliance with
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act's (FIRREA) administrative claims
procedure is not required before bankruptcy court can hear complaints that do not fall within the
defmition of claims under FIRREA but that are incident to FDIC's claims against its debtor); FDIC
v. Purcell (In re Purcell), 150 B.R. Ill, 114 (0. Vt. 1993) (explaining that because a provision in
FIRREA's administrative claims procedure referring to "claims" applies only to claims by creditors,
the provision does not prevent the bankruptcy court from exercising jurisdiction over debtor's cause
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Insurance Fund as a failed fmancial institution's potentially largest unsecured creditor. 1O Banking law allows the parent company to make an asset
transfer to avoid the threat of mandated restrictions. II It also gives an
unfulfilled payment a priority status in bankruptcy.12 The rules do not
state, however, under what circumstances an unfunded capital obligation
ought to be allowed. The legality of the asset transfer when a parent
company seeks bankruptcy protection is a crucial question for the banking industry.
Establishing an accord when the parent company and its bank subsidiary are both fmancially troubled requires a recognition of the interrelatedness of the fmancial. resources of the parent company and its bank
subsidiary.13 This approach, which examines the enterprise as a unit, requires close control and monitoring by the parent company of its subsidiary's operations. Specifically, Congress should legislate a fraudulent
conveyance exception for parent company asset transfers. Such a provision would require a determination of enterprise liability by either banking regulators or the parent company. The banking regulators must establish that the parent company, through interaffiliate transactions, is
risking the capital of the bank subsidiary. Alternatively, the parent company may elect to declare its choice of corporate operation as an integrated enterprise, routinely using the bank subsidiary assets to maximize
of action against FDIC as receiver for failed bank); All Season's Kitchen, Inc. v. FDIC (In re All
Season's Kitchen, Inc.), 145 B.R. 391, 393 (Bankr. D. Vt 1992) ("[W]e believe that the new legal
theory being advanced by FDIC and RTC in Bankruptcy Courts across the country threatens the
efficient functioning of the federal Bankruptcy system."); In re Gemini Bay Corp., 145 B.R. 350,
352 (Bankr. M.D. Aa. 1992) (holding FlRREA does not preclude the bankruptcy court from
exercising jurisdiction over the resolution of creditor's objections to FDIC's claim against debtor's
estate because the claim does not involve FDIC's claim against assets of the failed institution).
10. 12 U.S.c. § 1823 (1994) (stating that while the federal government guarantees that the
deposit insurance fund will meet its obligations to depositors, taxpayers are ultimately liable).
The FDIC is commonly the largest creditor of the receivership estate. The FDIC operates in
dual capacities: as FDIC-Corporate and FDIC·Receiver. When an institution fails, the FDICCorporate pays insured depositors. It then becomes a general creditor in the receivership estate of the
failed institution for the amount that it has paid to insured depositors. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (1994).
The FDIC-Receiver satisfies secured claims. It "stands in the shoes" of the member institution and
liquidates the assets for distribution to the creditors. Unsecured creditors, such as the FDICCorporate, are paid ratably. 12 U.S.c. § 1821(g) (1994). Member institutions fund the FDIC by
paying insurance premiums based upon the financial institution's deposit base. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)
(1994).
II. Capital-based regulations impose stringent regulatory controls, including dividend and
growth restrictions and forced conservatorship. There are five capital categories: well capitalized,
adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, and critically
undercapitalized. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 38(b)(I),
12 U.S.C. § 1831(0)(b)(I) (1994).
12. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) gives a
priority status to unfunded capital maintenance obligations. 11 U.S.C. § 365(0) (1994). See
discussion infra Part m.c.
13. Bankruptcy law labels the concept substantive consolidation. See infra note 141 and
accompanying text. This article posits that there should be a pre-petition recognition of the
relatedness of the enterprise given the moral hazard of federal deposit insurance in the banking
industry.
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profits and diversify losses of the entire undertaking. I ' Either situation
would immunize an asset transfer should the parent company file for
bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over these
particular assets of the debtor parent company's estate would be limited
to an evidentiary review for procedural sufficiency. FDIC-Receiver
would cease to have a review function over these assets. Moreover, if
FDIC-Corporate assesses cross-guarantee liability against the sister institutions, the asset transfers would serve as a credit against the amount
of the liability. Legally, such a proposal may be the only way that a
capital-weakened parent company, that decided pre-bankruptcy to shore
up its bank subsidiary, may avoid the fraudulent conveyance provision.
Part II of the article identifies the statutory basis for the dormant
conflict between Titles 11 and 12. Specifically, this section lists the
broad array of somewhat identical discretionary powers that both the
bankruptcy court and the banking regulatory agencies have as trustee and
receiver for insolvent corporations and financial institutions, respectively. Part II concludes with an analysis of the cases in which these discretionary powers of the trustee and the receiver have come into conflict.
Part III discusses the bankruptcy of the Bank of New England Corporation (BNEC). The factual history of this case provides an example of
the types of legal issues that an insolvent holding company faces under
the banking laws when it files for protection under the Bankruptcy Code.
The section ends by specifying post-BNE legislative reforms designed to
address issues raised during the liquidation of that failed enterprise.
Part N identifies the statutory rights that creditors have under the
fraudulent conveyance law, including the good faith exception. Finally,
Part V proposes an amendment to the current regulatory scheme that
would require asset transfers from an insolvent holding company. It posits that the policies supporting the good faith exception are not compromised by the concomitant goal of protecting the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund. The banking enterprise exception establishes a procedure for
regulatory assets transfers that is reviewable by the bankruptcy court, and
operates as a credit against cross-guarantee liability. The proposed
change will more closely merge the policies and purposes of the two
schemes that converge when a bank holding company becomes insolvent.

14. Most parent companies maintain the capital status of their bank subsidiaries voluntarily
because it is in the best interest of the enterprise. H. Rodgin Cohen, Easing FDICIA' s Burden: A
Holding Company Level Approach to Compliance, 11 No. 21 BANKING POL'y REp. I, 29 (1992)
(suggesting that mandating compliance with many banking regulations at the parent company level
would be cost-effective and consistent with the exercise of parent company control). But see Helen
A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of
Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REv. 314 (1990).
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THE STATUTORY CONFLICTS: EQUITABLE AND LEGAL REMEDIES

A. Equitable Relief
The confluence of the bankruptcy protection and the bank regulatory authority raises the issue of the interaction between the automatic
stay and the anti-injunction provision. ls Among the protections that a
debtor seeks by filing a bankruptcy petition is a restraint from creditors
pursuing repayment of debts. The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code provides this protection. However, if the debtor is a parent
company with an outstanding capital maintenance commitment, the bank
failure regulatory scheme allows administrative intervention that could
upset those insolvency procedures. As regulators of parent companies,
the Federal Reserve and OTS have broad power to charge the failure to
follow any banking law or regulation as an unsafe and unsound practice
and to issue a cease and desist order to halt the particular practice. 16 One
question that needs to be answered is which statutory scheme, bankruptcy or bank failure law, controls the debtor parent company's unfunded capital obligation.
1. The Bankruptcy Trustee's Powers: 11 U.S.c. § 362-The
Automatic Stayn

The filing of a petition in bankruptcy, without any further action,
results in a suspension of legal proceedings as an operation of law. 18 This
anti-injunction power is in the form of an automatic stay. The automatic
15. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994) (explaining the automatic stay provision); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)
(1994) (describing the anti-injunction provision). See discussion infra Pan D.
16. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2) (1994).
17. 'The automatic stay provision provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities ....
(b) The filing of a petition under section 30 I, 302, or 303 of this title, or of an application
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, does not operate
as a stay ....
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an
action or proceeding by a govemmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police
or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a
money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power, ...
11 U.S.c. § 362(a), (b)(4)-(5) (1994).
18. The Code provides two options for debtors hoping to seek relief and protection from
creditors. One option, a Chapter 7 liquidation, allows the debtor to obtain a complete discharge or
release from liability on all pre-bankruptcy debt In Chapter 7 proceedings, there is a court-appointed
trustee who manages the debtor's estate. The trustee removes the debtor from control of its property
and then takes charge of all nonexempt property of the debtor, converts it into cash and equitably
distributes the proceeds to creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1994).
The other option, a Chapter 11 reorganization, allows the debtor to make a court-approved
schedule of payments to its creditors over time. In Chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor may maintain
management of its estate. However, in either proceeding, the bankruptcy court oversees most of the
decisions of the trustee or the debtor regarding the management of the estate. The court also hears
claims raised by creditors regarding the management of the estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1102 (1994).
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stay prevents the commencement or continuation of any action or proceeding against the debtor or the property of the estate; any act to create,
perfect, or enforce a secwity interest in the debtor's property; and any act
to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor or the property of
the estate. 19 There are several exceptions to the issuance of an injunction.
Noteworthy is that issuance of the injunction is not authorized if the operation of the stay will serve to undercut a governmental unit's police or
regulatory powers.20
2. The Anti-Injunction Power: 12 U.S.c. §§ 1818(iY' and 1821(jy2
The federal banking laws empower the bank regulatory agencies to
regulate the supervision and operation of federally insured fmancial institutions. 23 As administrative agencies with broad supervisory powers,
their regulatory processes operate free from judicial interference until
there is a fmal agency action. The administrative agencies have an antiinjunction power similar to that found in bankruptcy.24
The banking laws also provide for the reorganization and liquidation
of insolvent fmancial institutions.2S Specifically, they provide for the appointment of the FDIC as conservator or receiver.26 As receiver, the
FDIC has an anti-injunction power that bars courts from taking any action by regulation or order that would restrain or affect the powers or

19. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1994). See discussion infra, Part n.A.3.a. regarding MCorp. Recently,
creditors have begun negotiating a pre-petition agreement waiving the court's impost of the
automatic stay See Rafael Efrat, The Case for Limited Enforceability of a Pre-Petition Waiver of the
Automatic Stay, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1133 (1995); cf. William Bassin, Why Courts Should Refuse
to Enforce Pre-Petition Agreements That Waive Bankruptcy's Automatic Stay Provision, 28 IND. L.
REv. 1 (1994).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) restricts jurisdiction of the courts, stating that "[n]o court shall have
jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order
under any such section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate or set aside any such notice or
order." 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1994).
22. Section 1821(j) provides, "[e]xcept as provided in this section, no court may take any
action except at the request of the Board of Directors by regulation or order, to restrain or affect the
exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or a receiver." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)
(1994).
23. The federal banking agencies have the authority to impose administrative sanctions
whenever there is (1) an unsafe or unsound practice; (2) a violation of a law, rule or regulation, any
condition imposed in writing by the agency in connection with the granting of an application or other
request, or any other written agreement entered into with the agency. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)
(1994).
24. Section 1818(i)(I), which is analogous to § 1821G>, is the anti-injunction provision
available to federal banking regulators.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1994).
26. The Federal Reserve also regulates state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve system. 12 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1994). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (DCC),
an agency within the Department of the Treasury, charters and supervises national banks. 12 U.S.C.
§ 21 (1994). It also makes the determination of when to close those institutions. 12 U.S.c. § 191
(1994).
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functions of the FDIC, except at the request of the FDIC. 27 By giving the
receiver absolute control over the affairs of the insolvent financial institution, Congress has precluded judicial intervention into the receiver's
exercise of its discretionary powers.28
3. The Automatic Stay vs. the Anti-Injunction Power
The federal banking agen~ies have wielded their substantial powers
skillfully, albeit with an air of unseemliness. Three cases that follow examine the bank regulatory agencies' successful challenges to the operation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy.
a.

MCorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (MCorpr

The jurisdictional conflict between the courts and the bank agency
was first tested in MCorp. MCorp addressed and resolved the issue of
whether the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay was applicable to internal
administrative agency provisions.)O
MCorp, a Texas bank holding company in voluntary bankruptcy,
filed for application of the automatic stay to enjoin the Federal Reserve
from continuing two administrative proceedings concerning its affairs.)!
MCorp operated a system of twenty-five subsidiary banks throughout the
state of Texas.l2 Prior to its bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve had issued
cease and desist orders requiring MCorp to restore the capital levels of
several MCorp bank subsidiaries.)) Arguing that the administrative
27. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
28. Many commentators have described the FDIC's powers as receiver for an insolvent
financial institution as "superpowers" because they are analogous to the bankruptcy court's broad
sweep of discretion under the Code. See generally Richard F. Broude, The Unstoppable Force Meets
the Immovable Object: FIRREA and the Bankruptcy Code, 715 PLIICOMM 559 (1995); Steven
Khadavi, The Viability of Maintaining Successful Actions Against the RTC and the FDIC, 63 OEO.
WASH. L. REv. 665 (1995); Carol Anne Sennello, FlRREA's Damage Provisions: Inequitable,
Unnecessary and Costly to Boot, 45 DUKE L.J. 183 (1995); Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Laws
Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE LJ. 469 (1992); Jeffrey S. Westin, Contract Repudiation and
Claim Determination Under FlRREA: The Need for FDIC Restraint and Legislative Reform, 12
ANN. REv. BANKING L. 557 (1993).
29. 101 B.R. 483 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 900 F.2d 852
(5th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
30. MCorp, 101 B.R. at 483.
31. The Federal Reserve brought an administrative action requiring the holding company to
inject capital into its failing bank subsidiaries. The holding company, which filed for bankruptcy
after the beginning of the administrative proceedings, sought the protection of the bankruptcy court's
automatic stay provision to terminate the administrative agency's proceedings.
32. Because Texas had restrictions on branch banks, MCorp, like many bank holding
companies, chose the holding company structure to evade those restrictions. See generally Robert
Charles Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARv. L. REv. 787 (1979)
(discussing the holding company structure in the context of government regulation).
33. The Federal Reserve and the FHLBB, which is now OTS, interpreted their respective
chartering statutes to permit net worth maintenance agreements and the source of strength condition.
See 12 U.S.c. § 1467(a), (e)(2) (1994) (thrifts); 12 U.S.c. § 1842(c) (1994) (banks) (authorizing an
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agency no longer had jurisdiction given its insolvency, the parent company sought the protection of the bankruptcy stay.34 Claiming that the
stay was inapplicable to an internal, ongoing agency proceeding, the
Federal Reserve barred application of the stay under section 1818(1)(1 ).35
The Supreme Court concluded that the stay did not operate under two
exceptions: (1) in furtherance of regulatory or governmental proceedings
and (2) powers.36 The Court's ruling exempted the administrative proceedings from the automatic stay until there was fmal agency action. 37
MCorp did not specifically address whether the bankruptcy court
should have concurrent jurisdiction over a fmal administrative proceeding. On close examination of the bankruptcy regime, there is no jurisdictional conflict between the administrative agency and the bankruptcy
court. Not only does the Code give the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the debtor's estate,38 the bankruptcy court
exercises concurrent jurisdiction in analogous situations.39

evaluation of the projected financial and managerial ability of a potential parent company's current
and future financial ability to assist the bank or thrift in maintaining its capital). Using net worth
maintenance agreements (thrifts) or regulatory orders based on the source of strength condition
(banks), the regulators ordered the parent company to transfer funds to an insolvent subsidiary. See
Cassandra Jones Havard, Back to The Parent: Holding Company Liability Jar Subsidiary BanksDiscussion oj the Net Worth Maintenance Agreement, the Source oj Strength Doctrine, and the
Prompt Corrective Action Provision, 16 CARDOW L. REv. 2353, 2370~91 (1995). Several fmancial
institutions that received such orders challenged the authority of the regulatory agencies to issue
them, alleging that the orders were unspecific regarding the amount of the financial commitment
and/or when it became effective. See generally Leonard Bierman & Donald R. Fraser, The "Source
of Strength" Doctrine: Formulating the Future oj America's Financial Markets, 12 ANN. REv.
BANKING L. 269 (1993); Craig L. Brown, Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc.: Evaluating
the Source-of-Strength Doctrine, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 235 (1992); Kieran J. Fallon, Source of
Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Critique of the "Source-oJ-Strength" Doctrine in Banking
Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344 (1991); James F. Groth, Can Regulators Force Bank Holding
Companies to Bail Out Their Failing Subsidiaries?-An Analysis oj the Federal Reserve Board's
Source·ol-Strength Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 112 (1991).
34. MCorp, 101 B.R. at 485.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1), which is analogous to section 1821(j), is the Federal Reserve
Board's anti-injunction statute. See supra text accompanying notes 21, 22.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), (5) (1994). See supra text accompanying note 17.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), (5) (1994).
38. 28 U.S.c. 1334(b) (1994).
39. The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation that the statute's specific
application is limited to jurisdictional confrontations between district courts. Perhaps hinting at its
leanings, the Court said, "prosecution of the Board proceedings, prior to the entry of a fmal order
and prior to the commencement of any enforcement action, seems unlikely to impair the Bankruptcy
Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the estate protected by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d)."
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32,42 (1991).
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b. Carlton v. FirstCorp, Inc. 40

In Carlton v. FirstCorp, Inc., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Code's automatic stay provision would not operate to stay
an ongoing administrative action by the OTS.41 The court found that the
anti-injunction provision of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(1)(1) precluded the bankruptcy court from interfering with internal agency proceedings as well as
temporary cease and desist orders.42 The effect of the court's ruling was
to let stand an OTS order requiring the transfer of a solvent savings and
loan to a capital-deficient one.
FirstCorp owned two institutions, First of Raleigh and First of Durham. 43 When the Raleigh institution became insolvent (First of Durham
remained financially sound), OTS placed it in federal receivership.44 It
also issued a temporary cease and desist order seeking a payment from
the parent company of $45 million, the amount needed to restore the
institution to solvency.4S
FirstCorp sought an injunction to suspend enforcement of the temporary cease and desist order and filed for protection under Chapter 11 of
the Code.46 The parent company requested an order from the bankruptcy
court conf'mning that the automatic stay provisions of the Code suspended the internal OTS administrative proceedings and the temporary
cease and desist order. 47 The bankruptcy court held that the automatic
stay applied to both the ongoing OTS proceeding and to the temporary
order. 48 The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision holding that the automatic stay applied neither to the administrative proceeding nor to the temporary order. 49

40. 967 F.2d 942, 943 (4th Cir. 1992). FirstCorp, Inc. was a savings and loan holding
company in North Carolina that owned and operated two savings and loan associations, First of
Durham and First of Raleigh. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), the designated
regulator prior to the passage of FIRREA, conditioned the acquisition of the Raleigh institution on
FirstCorp's maintaining the institution's net worth at appropriate levels.
41. FirstCorp, 967 F.2d at 946.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 943.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 944, n.3. OTS, as the regulator of savings and loan holding companies, then ordered
the parent company to minimize the Raleigh institution losses. Specifically, OTS ordered FirstCorp
to immediately transfer its stock in the Durham subsidiary to a subsidiary of the Raleigh institution
and cancel and return two capital notes to the Raleigh institution that FirstCorp had received in
exchange for the 1987 capital infusion of $13.4 million. OTS also issued a "Notice of Charges"
charging FirstCorp with committing an "unsafe and unsound practice" because it failed to maintain
the Raleigh institution's net worth as agreed at the time of acquisition.
46. FirstCorp filed for the injunction in federal district court as authorized under the statute.
The statute gives the affected institution ten days to request a court order to set aside, limit, or
suspend enforcement of the administrative order. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2) (1994).
47. Carlton, 967 F.2d at 942.
48. In re FirstCorp, Inc., 122 B.R. 484, 491 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990).
49. In re FirstCorp, Inc., 129 B.R. 450, 452 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
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The Fourth Circuit, in FirstCorp, extended the MCorp rule and held
that the automatic stay provision of the Code is inapplicable to a temporary cease and desist orders under 12 U.S.c. § 1818(1)(1).50 FirstCorp
argued that the temporary cease and desist order was distinguishable
from an ongoing administrative proceeding because it is a demand for
the parent company to transfer assets of the bankruptcy estate immediately.51 The circuit court explicitly rejected this argument. 52 The court did,
however, limit its ruling to the application of the automatic stay to section 1818(1)(1).53 The court expressly declined to make a ruling on
whether the temporary cease and desist order is subject to the MCorp
rule, falling within the exceptions to the automatic stay.54
The circuit court found in FIRREA that the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issues arising out of the failure of savings and
loan institutions. It interpreted 12 U.S.C. § 18210) as absolute by prohibiting courts from restraining or affecting the RTC's right to manage,
contract, and dispose of assets. 55 The court distinguished the two regulatory schemes by explaining that FIRREA's focus is liquidation, while
Title 11 is reorganization. 56 That distinction was significant in determining the limits of the bankruptcy court's equitable powers. The court
stated, "[t]he comprehensive scheme of FIRREA indicates Congress'
intent to allow the RTC full rein to exercise its statutory authority without injunctive restraints imposed by bankruptcy courts or district courts
in other proceedings. ,,57

50. Carlton, 967 F.2d at 946. The In re FirstCorp appeal raised two issues. The fIrst, an issue
of fIrst impression, was whether the automatic stay provision was applicable to the temporary cease
and desist order. The other issue, whether the automatic stay was applicable to internal
administrative proceedings, had been resolved by Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v.
MCorp Fin., 502 U.S. 32 (1991). See infra Part II.A.3.a.
51. Carlton, %7 F.2d at 946.
52. The court instead based its decision on the existing laws and congressional policy
supporting the regulation of the nation's banking system. It seemed signifIcant to the court that the
regulatory scheme provided the bank holding company with injunctive relief for temporary cease
and desist orders as well as with an appeal process. The opinion concluded by stating that though "a
comprehensive scheme governing the oversight of fmancial institutions, from administrative control
through judicial review of the administrative agency's actions, and by explicitly making the scheme
exclusive, Congress intended to exclude other methods of interfering with the regulatory action." Id.
at 946.
53. Id.
54. II U.S.c. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1994). See Carlton, %7 F.2d at 946, n.5.
55. In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d 283, 287 (4th Cir. 1992).
56. In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 288.
57. Id. at 290. In a related matter, RTC v. FirstCorp, Inc., 973 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1992), the
parent company was required to cure immediately the defIciency in its capital maintenance
obligation for its subsidiary savings and loan institution as a prerequisite to maintaining its capital
maintenance agreement, pursuant to 11 U.S.c. § 365(0) (1994).
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c. In Re Landmark Land Co., Inc. vs. RTCS 8
Landmark Land Company (Landmark), which wholly owned Oaktree Savings Bank (Oaktree), caused or permitted six subsidiaries of
Oaktree to file Chapter 11 petitions.59 The OTS ordered Landmark, a
nondebtor, to withdraw the bankruptcy petitions of the subsidiaries pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(l).60 Two days later, OTS declared Oaktree
insolvent and appointed the RTC as receiver. 61 The RTC organized New
Oaktree and applied to OTS for chartering.62 The subsidiaries successfully obtained a preliminary injunction preventing RTC from assuming
control of them. 6J Specifically, the injunction prevented the receiver from
calling or initiating shareholder meetings of its subsidiaries, changing
management, or interfering with the subsidiaries' orderly operations. 64
When the RTC moved to dismiss the temporary restraining order, the
district court denied the motion and converted the TRO into a prelimi58. In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 283. See also Richard F. Hewitt, Jr., In re
Landmark Land Co.: A Landmark Roadblock/or Bankruptcy Courts v. Federal Regulators?, 45 S.c.
L. REv. 68 (1993); Landmark Land Co., v. OTS, 990 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1993). OTS issued an order
limiting directors' authority and freezing the assets of directors and their family members. The
directors then sought to enjoin enforcement of the order. The court found that the district court
abused its discretion in granting an injunction where it failed to apply the four criteria for
entertaining a preliminary injunction.ld.
59. In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 287.
60. Landmark filed suit in the district court in Louisiana seeking to enjoin OTS from enforcing
the order to withdraw the bankruptcy petitions of the subsidiaries. The Louisiana District Court
enjoined the OTS, transferring the proceeding to the district court in South Carolina. The case went
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on mandamus review, with OTS seeking to vacate the order of
the Louisiana District Court. OTS argued that, although the cease and desist order required the
parent court to withdraw the bankruptcy petitions, the district court lacked jurisdiction over
administrative proceedings involving bank regulation and supervision. Furthermore, OTS contended
that properly issued cease and desist orders could not be "related" to the bankruptcy proceedings
because those orders would have no effect on the bankruptcy. See Landmark Land Co. v. OTS, 948
F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that the district court supervising the bankruptcy proceeding could
not exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c. § I334(b) to enjoin OTS's enforcement of an
administrative order under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(1)(1».
61. In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 287.
62. OTS used a purchase and assumption agreement in resolving the failure of Oaktree. Under
that agreement, New Oaktree purchased all of RTC's right, title, and interest in Oaktree's assets,
including its wholly owned subsidiaries. OTS then appointed RTC as conservator of New Oaktree.
Id. at 284-85.
63. The subsidiaries initially received a temporary restraining order from the bankruptcy court
against Oaktree, preventing it from calling a shareholder's meeting to elect new members to their
board of directors. When OTS appointed the RTC as receiver, the subsidiaries moved to have the
temporary restraining order converted into a preliminary injunction. The subsidiaries argued that the
RTC's plan was to liquidate the assets of the subsidiaries to the disadvantage of the subsidiaries'
creditors. Id. at 287 -88. The bankruptcy court justified its actions in restraining the RTC as a need to
protect the shareholders' interests and debtors' rights. Id.
64. The RTC issued a temporary cease and desist order against one of the subsidiaries,
Landmark Land Company, Inc. and its four directors. The temporary cease and desist order was
accompanied by a notice of charges for a permanent cease and desist order, removal and prohibition
order, and civil penalties. The temporary cease and desist order was enjoined by the Eastern District
of Louisiana, and the case was transferred to the District Court of South Carolina. Landmark Land
Co.,948 F.2d at 911.
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nary injunction, preserving the separate status of the subsidiaries.65 The
court of appeals vacated that injunction.66
The circuit court determined that the issue of whether the bankruptcy court could issue the injunction was merely a question of statutory
interpretation.67 By finding that the plain language of the statute was consistent with its legislative history, the court decided that the RTC properly used its powers and the anti-injunction provisions barred any equitable relief. 68 The court reasoned that:
Congress has delegated the responsibility of resolving failed thrifts to
the RTC, and resolution of a failed thrift requires control over all of
the thrift's assets. Because the anti-injunction provision specifically
precludes equitable interference, the district court may not prevent the
RTC from exercising its lawful ownership rights based on the court's
determination that current mana§ement is best suited to rehabilitate
the thrift's bankrupt subsidiaries.

The court's ruling effectively confmed the parties' relief to a legal
remedy. Those remedies are found in the receivership's claims procedure. 70

65.
66.
67.

Id.
In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 287,290.
Id. at 289-90.
68. Id. at 287-90.
69. Id. at 290. The court distinguished In re American Continental Corp., 105 B.R. 564 (D.
Ariz. 1989) (declining to follow In re American Continental Corp. because the court found that the
district court should have sustained the RTC's motion to dismiss the subsidiaries' voluntary petition
for relief under Chapter II, stating that the denial of the motion to dismiss was an interference with
RTC rights and functions, and deciding that its statutory interpretation was also inconsistent with the
RTC's statutory rights and functions). In re Landmark Land Co., 973 F.2d at 289. The liquidation of
Lincoln Savings and Loan Association (Lincoln) also raised issues involving the jurisdiction of the
Code and the bank regulatory agencies. One day before FHLBB placed Lincoln into
conservatorship, eleven wholly owned subsidiaries of Lincoln filed Chapter 11 petitions. FSLICconservator replaced management at the subsidiaries. Four months later, the FHLBB placed Lincoln
in receivership and transferred its assets to a newly chartered savings and loan association. The RTC,
as successor to the conservator of the newly chartered association, moved to disallow the Chapter 11
cases. The district court denied the motion and preserved the separate status of the subsidiaries. The
circuit court vacated that injunction. Id.
70. See infra Part II.B.2 for discussion of 12 U.S.C. § I82I(d)(3)-OI) (1994).
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B. The Legal Remedies
1. The Trustee's Avoidance Power under 11 U.S.c. § 54871
The Bankruptcy Code provides for avoidance of asset transfers under preference and fraudulent conveyance provisions.72 A debtor or its
trustee may avoid transfers in which the creditor received more than it
would be eligible to receive under the liquidation rules of Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code.
A debtor or trustee in bankruptcy can avoid transfers that were actually or constructively fraudulent. Section 548 recognizes that transfers
made in the year prior to bankruptcy may result in either actual fraud
[(a)(l)f3 or constructive fraud [(a)(2)],74 meaning that the transfers were
made without the transferor receiving "reasonably equivalent value.'1l5
The Code provides an exception to the requirement that there be a
reasonable exchange for value. The good faith exception gives the nondebtor party an opportunity to prove that the transaction was absent of
fraudulent intent. If the transferee can prove a lack of intent to avoid the
bankruptcy process by showing a legitimate exchange or bargain, the
trustee must recognize the validity of that exchange and cannot avoid the
transaction.'6

71. 11 u.s.c. § 548 provides, in relevant part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(I) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such
transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or
obligation; and
(B)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(m was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a
transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small
capital; or
(lll) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be
beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
72. 11 U.S.c. § 547-48.
73. 11 U.S.c. § 548(a)(I).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2).
75. [d. See discussion infra Pan IV.
76. The "good faith exception" provides, in relevant part:
[A] transferee or obligee of such transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good
faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation
incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to
the debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation.
(d)(I) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such transfer is so
perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor against whom applicable law permits
such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the property transferred that is
superior to the interest in such property of the transferee, but if such transfer is not so
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2. The FDIC-Receiver's Avoidance Power and Claims Procedure
under 12 U.S.C. § 1821 71
Analogous to the bankruptcy trustee's powers under section 362 is
the FDIC's fraudulent conveyance provision, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d). It
allows the federal agency, acting as receiver, to avoid certain transfers of
property, interests in property, or obligations incurred by, among others,
a person who is a debtor of an FDIC-insured institution.78 Two conditions
must be met in order for the section to be applicable: (1) the transfer
must be made or the obligation incurred within five years of the FDIC's
appointment as receiver and (2) the transfer must be made or the obligation incurred with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the insured depository institution, receiver, or federal banking agency.79 Furthermore,
the FDIC has the right to recover fraudulently transferred property or its
value for the benefit of the insured depository institution. so That right is
"superior to any rights of a trustee or any other party (other than a party
which is a Federal agency) under Title 11. ,,81
12 U.S.C. § 1821 also operates as a jurisdictional bar for a court to
act on claims regarding the assets of a failed financial institution's
assets.82 The statute grants the FDIC as conservator or receiver successor
status to decide claims against the insolvent institution. 83 In its capacity as
receiver, the statute authorizes the FDIC to exercise "all rights, titles,
powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution ... with respect to the institution and the assets of the institution."84
The statute and implementing regulations create an administrative
process for determining the claims against the assets of a failed institution. 85 Specifically, until a creditor exhausts the administrative claims

perfected before the commencement of the case, such transfer is made immediately
before the date of the filing of the petition.
11 u.s.c. § 548(c)-(d)(I) (1994).
77. 12 U.S.C § 1821 (1994).
78. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(A).
79. Id.
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(l7)(B).
81. 12 u.s.c. § 1821(d)(17)(D). The FDIC thus precedes all other claimants, except federal
agencies, in collecting from the bankruptcy estate of the transferee. Swire, supra note 28, at 486.
82. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(ll).
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3).
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).
85. Courts have read FlRREA to contain a "mandatory exhaustion requirement" that
"preclude[s] suit on a claim that was not first presented to the [FDICl." Office and Profl Employees
Int'l Union Local 2 v. FDIC, 962 F.2d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See also Meliezer v. RTC, 952 F.2d
879,882 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that 12 U.S.c. § 1821(d)(13)(D) "clearly establishes a statutory
exhaustion requirement"); Rosa v. RTC, 938 F.2d 383, 391-92 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding statutory
exhaustion requirement in language of 12 U.S.C. § 1821).
In enacting FlRREA, "Congress expressly withdrew jurisdiction from all courts over any
claim to a failed bank's assets that are made outside the procedure set forth in section 1821." FDIC
v. Shain, Schaffer & Rafanello, 944 F.2d 129, 132 (3d Cir. 1991). See Brady Development Co. v.
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process, a court lacks jurisdiction to hear "all suits seeking payment from
the assets of the affected institution; all suits seeking satisfaction from
those assets; and all actions for the detennination of rights vis-a-vis those
assets."86 The jurisdictional bar affects legal and equitable remedies and
operates against creditors as well as debtors. 87 The claims process requires the receiver to publish a notice to the failed institution's creditors
infonning them of the deadline for presentation of claims,88 to mail a
"similar" notice to "any creditor shown on the institution's books,' ..9 and
to make a determination allowing or disallowing the claim within 180
days.90 Administrative or judicial review is available for any disallowed
claim.91 This claims procedure applies even when the entity filing the
claims has filed a petition for bankruptcy.

RTC, 14 F.3d 998,1003 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress chose to place jurisdictional limits on
the power of federal courts with respect to matters involving failed savings and loans under
FIRREA).
86. Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1151-52 (1st Cir. 1992). The court noted that "FIRREA
makes participation in the administrative claims review process mandatory for all parties asserting
claims against failed institutions," and "where a claimant has ... failed to initiate an administrative
claim within the filing period, the claimant necessarily forfeits any right to pursue a claim against the
failed institution's assets in any court." /d. (internal citation omitted).
87. FIRREA's jurisdictional bar has been litigated in the circuit courts and has been applied to
various claims. See National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States v. FDIC, 21 F.3d
469 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that 12 U.S.c. § 1821(j) does not bar suit to the extent of seeking a
declaratory judgment instead of an injunction); Carney v. RTC, 19 F.3d 950, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that section 1821(j) deprived the court of jurisdiction regarding claims of injunctive relief
and declaratory judgment); Lloyd v. FDIC, 22 F.3d 335, 336-37 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a
debtor's suit for equitable reformation or cancellation of a mortgage contract is subject to the
jurisdictional bar of section 1821(d)(l3)(D»; Henderson v. Bank of New England, 986 F.2d 319,
320-21 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that claims by unsuccessful credit card applicants are subject to
jurisdictional bar of section 1821(d)(13)(D»; Meliezer, 952 F.2d at 883 (holding that a mortgagor's
claim of negligence by a fmancial institution for allowIng mortgagor to assume insufficient fire
insurance was subject to the jurisdictional bar of section 1821(d)(13)(D»; RTC v. Elman, 949 F.2d
624,626-27 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that law finn's assertion of retaining a lien in order to retain
custody of a client's legal files is subject to the jurisdictional bar of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D»;
Freeman v. RTC, No. C-93-4215-VRW, 1994 WL 398515, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
claimant's cross claims were barred by the "60-day statute of limitations contained in 12 U.S.c. §
1821 (d)(6)(B)"); see also Ward v. RTC, 996 F.2d 99, 104 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Like injunction,
rescission is a 'judicial restraint' that is barred by [12 U.S.c.] § 1821(j).").
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B) (1994).
89. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(C).
90. 12 U.S.c. § 1821(d)(5)(A). Although claims that are untimely filed must be disallowed,
there is an exception for those that are filed late because the claimant did not receive notice of the
appointment of the receiver in time to file a claim prior to the bar date. The receiver has the
discretion to review those claims, provided there is time to permit payment of the claims. 12 U.S.c.
§ 1821(d)(5)(C). The statute does not provide a basis for this exception, which means that. even if
the receiver fails to mail the required notice, the claimants must still exhaust their administrative
remedies. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(C). See also Meliezer, 952 F.2d at 882 (holding that 12 U.S.c.
§ 1821 (d)(13)(D) "clearly establishes a statutory exhaustion requirement").
91. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d)(6)(A)(i)-(ii) (explaining that a claimant seeking judicial review of
the receiver's decision may file an action in federal district court within 60 days after the receiver
has disallowed an adntinistrative claim or at the expiration of the 180-day period allowed for
processing the administrative claim, whichever comes first).

96

DENVER UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

III. BNE: A PARADIGM
The ongoing BNE litigation provides an illustration of the substantive conflict between the two statutory schemes.92 The conflict of procedure and doctrine becomes more distinct by analyzing the fraudulent
conveyance claim and the receiver's administrative review of that claim.
A. Factual History and the Trustee's Claims
The Bank of New England Corporation (BNEC) was a bank holding
company that owned three bank subsidiaries: Bank of New England
(BNE) , Connecticut Bank and Trust Co. (CBT), and Maine National
Bank (MNB).93 BNE, the largest of the banks, which had substantial real
estate investments in New England, began to deteriorate. 94 The parent
company, BNEC, pursuant to regulatory orders, made asset transfers in
an attempt to shore up BNE's capital deficiency.95 Despite these efforts, a
series of events led to a fast and serious decline. 96 By July 1989, BNEC
and BNE had both become insolvent.97 CBT and MNB both remained
solvent and of substantial value to BNEC.98

92. The failure of BNE resulted in a flurry of litigation. In addition to the ongoing district
court litigation discussed herein, the bankruptcy trustee filed a claim in the federal court of claims
alleging an unconstitutional taking due to the cross-guarantee claim. In Branch v. United States, 69
F.3d 1571, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court of
claims which held that the cross-guaranty provision of FIRREA--directing that when bank failure
causes loss to federal bank insurance fund, sister banks owned by same bank holding company may
be liable for loss--did not result in prohibited taking of property under Fifth Amendment, even
though assessment resulted in bank's insolvency and seizure by government. The court decided that
Branch must show that the cross-guarantee assessment was itself a "per se" taking in order for the
claim to succeed.ld.
93. Branch ex rei. Conn. Bank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 825 F. Supp. 384, 390-91. (D. Mass.
1993) [hereinafter BNE-I].
94. See Failure of the Bank of New England: Hearings Before the House of Republicans
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 24,26 (1991) (statement of
Robert ~arke, Comptroller of the Currency, discussing the damage that banks, including BNE,
suffered because the housing market dmpped in New England).
95. See BNE·l, 825 F. Supp. at 393.
96. In July 1989, OCC released its most recent examination of BNE, which indicated that
BNE's combination of uncontrolled growth and poor quality loan performance had led to its
insolvency. BNEC, which wholly owned BNE, became insolvent at about the same time due to its
loss in value in the bank subsidiary.ld. at 392-93.
Through a series of regulatory orders, the regulators began in early 1990, to control virtually
all the operations at BNEC. In February 1990, the Federal Reserve entered a cease and desist order
concerning BNEC's management, which included the appointment of a new Chief Executive Office,
satisfactory to the regulators. OCC, at the same time, entered a cease and desist order against BNE;
April and May, 1990 OCC entered the same cease and desist orders against CBT and MNB; fmally,
in May 1990, OCC issued an order against two other BNEC subsidiary banks, BNE-Old Colony and
BNE-West. ld. at 394.
97. ld.
98. ld. at 393.
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The BNEC Board of Directors (Board) took several measures to
improve the capital status of BNE.99 In December 1989, when BNE's
losses exceeded one billion dollars,lOo the Board began "The Asset Distribution Program," selling significant assets to its subsidiary banks. lol In
February 1990, the Federal Reserve and the acc issued regulatory orders that effectively controlled all management decisions and the daily
operations over the entire BNEC system. IOl
On January 3, 1991, BNEC and BNE issued a statement of fourth
quarter operating losses.103 The report of losses to the public led to massive depositor withdrawals at CBT and MNB. I04 In an effort to stop the
depositor runs at CBT and MNB, federal regulators issued a series of
regulatory orders that resulted in the acc declaring BNE insolvent and
appointing the FDIC as receiver. los BNEC filed a Chapter 7 petition in
bankruptcy.l06

99. Id. (stating that the BNEC Board of Directors were acting on the advice of the federal
regulators, who had a daily presence at BNE from the fall of 1989). The Federal Reserve entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in November 1989 that required BNEC to act as a
source of strength to its subsidiary banks. Id. at 393 n.4. See infra text accompanying note 124.
100. BNE-I, 825 F. Supp. at 393.
101. Id. BNEC transferred approximately $500 million in assets through this program. The
asset transfers were wide and varied ranging from proceeds from public debt offerings,.general asset
dispositions, and mergers of subsidiary banks into BNE, to transfers from BNEC non-bank
subsidiaries, tax refunds, prepaid expenses, and proceeds from use .of trademark:s. Id. at 394.
102. The Bank Subsidiaries that received regulatory orders included: BNEC, BNE, CBT, MNB,
BNE-Old Colony and BNE-West. Id. at 393-94.
103. Id. at 394. BNEC and BNE released reports showing operating losses of $450 million to
their respective regulatory agencies. News media reported the performance problems the following
day.Id.
104. The district court opinion described the customer lines as similar to the ones of the Great
Depression: "For the fIrst time since the Great Depression and the creation of the federal deposit
insurance system, depositors literally lined up outside the offices of a major federally insured bank
seeking to withdraw their funds." Id.
105. The FDIC actions followed MNB and CBT's sale of $1.48 billion and $133.4 million of
federal funds, respectively, to BNE.ld.
After BNE was declared insolvent, the FDIC as receiver for BNE (FDIC-BNE) immediately
valued the federal funds loan from CBT to BNE at zero, allowing the OCC to declare CBT insolvent
and appoint the FDIC as receiver (FDIC-CBn. That action allowed FDIC-BNE to value the MNB
federal funds loan at zero. FDIC-BNE then fIled a Notice of Assessment against MNB, which
remained solvent, demanding payment of $1 billion under the FDIC's cross-guarantee provision. 12
U.S.c. § 1815(e) (1994). The amount was based upon the FDIC's estimated loss as receiver for
BNE. Since MNB was unable to meet this demand, OCC declared MNB insolvent and appointed the
FDIC as receiver (FDIC-MNB), combining the three receiverships into FDIC-Receiver I. FDICReceiver I organized insolvent BNEC bank subsidiaries into separate Bridge Banks. Those banks
were used to transfer, through purchase and assumption transactions, most of the assets and
liabilities of the failed banks. FDIC-Receiver I then authorized the BNEC Board of Directors to fIle
a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. BNE·I, 825 F. Supp. at 394-95.
The assessment against MNB under the cross-guarantee provision was the FDIC's initial use
of this power by the FDIC as a receiver. A cross-guarantee assessment causes the failure of sibling
fInancial institutions by assessing them with the amount of the capital defIciency of the failed
institution. The regulatory agencies can then treat the bank subsidiaries as a single unit. The
provision has been challenged as an unconstitutional taking under the Constitution. See generally
Jennifer J. Alexander, Is the Cross-Guarantee Constitutional?, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1741 (1995)
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The bankruptcy court appointed Dr. Ben Branch as the trustee of the
107
estate of BNEC. He brought claims against the FDIC in its corporate
and receivership capacities and against Fleet Bank of Massachusetts
(Fleet), the ultimate purchaser of the failed BNE. I08
The trustee's common factual allegations alleged that BNE was
insolvent and pending failure when the FDIC required BNEC to transfer
a majority of its assets to BNE. I09 The trustee alleged that the FDIC made
the transfers with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud BNEC's
creditors, and/or that it was made at a time when BNEC was insolvent, or
was rendered insolvent thereby, in exchange for less than reasonably
equivalent value. 110 The trustee sought recovery of the various transfers
on the grounds that they were fraudulent transfers.
The complaint went on to state the claims against the transferees. II I
The trustee's claims against the FDIC-Receiver alleged that the receiver
was liable as the initial transferee of the assets. 112 The trustee claimed that
the FDIC-Corporate benefited because its liability to insured depositors
of BNE would be reduced as a result of the transfers,lI3 The trustee's
claims against the ultimate acquirer of the failed group, Fleet, alleged
that the Fleet Banks were liable as subsequent transferees on the grounds
that they did not acquire the transferred assets in good faith.114

(concluding that the provision does not effect a taking without just compensation); Jennifer B. Arlin,

O! Property Rights and The Fifth Amendment: FlRREA's Cross-Guarantee Reexamined, 33 WM. &
MARy L. REv. 293 (1991) (concluding that the cross-guarantee provision opens the door to
government abuse); Jeffery M. Cooper, Out On a Limb: FlRREA's Cross-Guarantee Provision
"Takes" Root in Branch v. United States, 33 Hous. L. REv. 299 (1996) (concluding that the Court
of Federal Claims was correct in fmding the provision unconstitutional); Tracy A. Helmer, Banking
on Solvency: The Takings PowerofFlRREA's Cross-Guarantee Provision, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 223
(1995) (concluding that the FDIC, by making assessments on solvent subsidiaries without a proper
showing of fraud or wrongdoing, is taking property without just compensation under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendinent).
106. BNE-l, 825 F. Supp. at 395.
107. ld. at 391. BNEC filed for bankruptcy January 7, 1991, the day after BNE failed. The
creditors' claims totaled $700 million.ld. at 395-96.
108. Branch notified potential bidders of his intent to file fraudulent conveyance claims for
those assets transferred from BNEC, CBT, and MNB. The Bridge Banks operated until July 1991,
when OCC closed them and appointed the FDIC as receiver (FDIC-Receiver 11). FDIC-Receiver II
sold the operations of all three former BNEC subsidiaries to Fleet Banks of Massachusetts. ld. at
395.
109. ld. at 392-93.
110. ld. at 395.
111. The fraudulent conveyance provision allows the trustee or debtor in possession to recover
the asset transfer from the initial transferee or from a subsequent transferee, when appropriate. 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994).
112. BNE-l, 825 F. Supp. at 401.
113.

ld.

114. The good faith defense exception is available to subsequent transferees under 11 U.S.C. §
548(c). See infra note 155.
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B. The District Court Decisions
1. BNE-I: The Asset Transfer Decision llS
The BNEC trustee determined that a crucial issue in the initial
resolution of the BNEC bankruptcy proceeding involved recovery of the
$2 million in asset transfers made under BNEC's Asset Distribution Program (Program). Specifically, the trustee alleged that the regulatory
agencies required the transfers of BNEC's assets to reduce the insurance
liability of FDIC-Corporate when BNE failed. The trustee buttressed this
claim by the fact that BNE was actually insolvent in 1989, but was not
declared insolvent by the regulatory agencies until almost two years
later, in 1991. 116
As a threshold matter, the court faced an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. The FDIC contended that the questioned asset transfers were
nonreviewable agency orders.1I1 The FDIC termed the trustee's inquiry
regarding the transfers an "impermissible collateral attack." Relying on
statutory procedures, the FDIC's argument was two-fold. First, the
agency contended that the trustee failed to request judicial review of the
administrative agency orders in a timely fashion. Second, the agency
argued that the questioned orders were explicitly exempted from review
because BNEC had consented to the issuance of the challenged orders." 8
In BNE-I, the district court recognized the authority of a bankruptcy
court to review asset transfers made pursuant to administrative procedures, based on its analysis of the authorizing language in the regulatory
orders. 119 That decision thwarted the regulators' arguments that the asset
transfers were invulnerable under the Code.
The court's decision addressed two jurisdictional claims: whether
the banking regulatory process precluded an avoidance action by the
bankruptcy trustee; and, alternatively, whether the asset transfers, because they were required by regulatory orders, were immune from attack
under the Code. 120
The regulators moved to have the claims dismissed, arguing that the
trustee's actions were an unwarranted and impermissible collateral attack, interfering with the agency's supervisory powers under section
1818(h)(2). Specifically, the FDIC argued that the cease and desist orders
were protected administrative agency orders and as such were subject to

BNE-I, 825 F. Supp. at 384.
BNE-I, 825 F. Supp. at 392-93.
117. Id. The FDIC based this argument on 12 U.S.C. section 1818(h)(2) (1994).
118. BNE-I, 825 F. Supp. at 398. The FDIC also argued that BNEC, by consenting to the
Federal Reserve's order, sanctioned the request that BNEC act as a "source of strength" to its bank
subsidiaries sanctioned the asset transfers. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
115.
116.
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judicial review under administrative agency procedures, furthering them
beyond the avoidance powers of the bankruptcy trustee. 121 To allow the
avoidance claim to proceed, in essence, they argued, permitted for an
improper review of the regulatory agencies' legal authority.
The court ruled that the claims were reviewable under the Code. 122
The court distinguished the agency's authority to require or authorize the
regulatory orders from its authority to execute the manner of the transfer
or the amount. The court found the trustee's challenge an appropriate
assessment of the."discretionary execution" of the orders.123 Because the
Federal Reserve and acc orders failed to "define the manner of transfer
or the specific assets to be transferred," those orders did not require the
challenged asset transfers. 124 The court found that because the challenged
orders did not mandate the specifics regarding the asset transfer, i.e., neither the amounts nor the manner, the trustee's claims did not attack the
agencies' exercise of discretionary, supervisory authority.
On the second jurisdictional issue, the agencies defended the asset
transfers as valid enforceable orders made in compliance with regulatory
authority. As such, they contended, the orders automatically met the
fraudulent conveyance prerequisite, making them transfers made in
"good faith and for fair consideration."125 Alternatively, the agency argued that the federal banking statutes, not the Code, govern the issue.
The court declmed to reach this issue based on its previous finding that

121.
122.
123.
124.

[d.

[d. at 399.
[d. at 398.
[d. at 398-99. In a footnote in the opinion, the court detailed the specificity found in the

orders:
The FED C & D Order provides in pertinent part: [BNEC] shall submit to the [FED] a
written plan to improve the capital positions of the consolidated organization and each of
the Subsidiary Banks ... The plan shall, at a minimum, address and consider: ... (e)
[BNEC's] responsibility to act as a source of financial strength to its Subsidiary Banks
and, in connection therewith, to use its assets to provide whatever additional capital
support to all its Subsidiary Banks as may be required by the Reserve Bank in a manner
consistent with the [FED's] Policy Statement on the responsibility of bank holding
companies to act as sources of financial strength to the subsidiary banks. Along with their
post-hearing brief, the defendants submitted two "capital maintenance plans," allegedly
created by BNEC pursuant to the FED C & D Order and FED MOU. These plans make
specific reference to some, but not all, of the challenged asset transfers, and the FED C &
D Order contains language which might arguably convert at least the second plan into an
"Order" under section 1818. Theoretically, this Court could consider the plans either as
public records of the FED, or as external evidence used to determine the Court's subject
matter jurisdiction. At this juncture, however, this Court declines to do either. As Branch
justifiably argues, the plans were submitted after the presentation of briefs and oral
argument and are technically outside the scope of the supplemental briefs requested by
the Court. Branch was thus provided no adequate opportunity to respond to the plans.
Moreover, although the Court doubts that the plans are concocted, the defendants have
presented no affidavits supporting their authenticity. For these reasons, the Court cannot
in good conscience consider the plans for the purposes of the present motion.
[d. at 399 (internal citations' omitted). See discussion infra Part V.S regarding the business
judgement rule's applicability to this issue.
125.

[d.
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the orders and agreements did not require the specific transfers that
BNEC made to its subsidiary banks. Therefore, the court also found that
the Code was the applicable law governing the review of these particular
claims. 126
2. BNE-II: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies l21
After the regulator's motion to dismiss, the court requested additional information regarding the trustee's filing of administrative
claims.128 FDIC-Receiver alleged that some of those claims were barred
for failure to exhaust the administrative process. The subject claims involved the downstream asset transfers from BNEC to BNE while both
were insolvent. The trustee sought recovery of the transfers, which were
detailed in the proof of claims filed with the Bankruptcy Court, under the
fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Code as well as under state
common law. 129 FDIC-Receiver alleged that the claims were barred because the trustee had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing the federal district court action. 130
FDIC-Receiver disallowed the claims during the administrative process. Specifically, FDIC-Receiver found that Branch failed to provide
sufficient information detailing the specificity of the transactions. FDICReceiver denied the claims on those grounds.
Branch contended, and the district court found, that the downstreamed transfers listed in the proof of claims sufficiently identified the
claims because they all related directly to the challenged transactions. \31
Furthermore, the court found the receiver's failure to acknowledge the
legitimacy of the claims appeared to be an obstruction to FIRREA's administrative process for the equitable distribution of claims. \32 In fact, the
court found that the downstreamed assets from the bank holding company were made while the banks were insolvent and thus no reasonably
equivalent value was given for the transfer, making the transfers fraudulent conveyances. 133 Interestingly, in BNE-II, the court concluded that the
challenged transfers were made in good faith· and for fair consideration. 134
This determination preserved the legitimacy of the transfers and bolstered the FDIC's argument that they were immune from challenge because they were made pursuant to regulatory orders.

126. Id.
127. Branch ex rei. Conn. Bank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 833 F. Supp. 56 (D. Mass. 1993)
(hereinafter BNE-II).
128. BNE-II, 833 F. Supp. at 57.
129. Id. at 58.
130. Id. at 57.
131. Id. at 60-62.
132. Id. at 59.
133. Id. at 58.
134. Id. at 62.

102

DENVER UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

C. Post-BNE Legislation

Congress took aggressive steps in post-FIRREA legislation to ensure that regulators would be able to enforce the previously ambiguous
capital maintenance obligations. m Some of those reforms were designed
to address issues left unresolved by the failure of BNE. The Crime Control Act and FDICIA appear beneficial to regulatory enforcement of the
obligations. l36 These recent legislative initiatives attempt to strengthen the
capital maintenance commitment by making the obligation a nondischargeable debt,1l7 removing the obligation'S eligibility as an
exemption,138 requiring the trustee to assume the obligation and immediately cure it, if necessary,139 and making the obligation a priority among
unsecured c1aimS. I40
Specifically, if the bank holding company has either "recklessly or
maliciously" failed to discharge a capital maintenance commitment, that
debt is nondischargeable. 141 In a Chapter 7 liquidation, a capital maintenance commitment claim receives priority over other unsecured claims.
Finally, section 365(0) requires a debtor parent company to assume and
perform a capital maintenance commitment according to its terms.142 In
effect, these provisions give the regulatory agencies' priority rights that
are superior to those of other creditors.
The BNE litigation also raised the issue of whether regulatory
authorization to make the challenged asset transfer ought to protect it
from an avoidance action in bankruptcy.143 Specifically, a parent company may have restored the capital of its bank subsidiary, i.e., made an
asset transfer, within a year became insolvent itself and a trustee moved
to avoid the transfer. Congress addressed this in part in FDICIA by creating or authorizing the parent company to make a limited asset
transfer. 144
The prompt corrective action provision (PCAtS is a legislative initiative intended to address the issues of parent company control while
See supr.a note 11.
See supra note 118.
11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(12)(1994).
Id. § 522(c)(3) (1994).
Id. § 365(0) (1994).
140. Id. § 507(a)(9) (1994).
141. Id. § 523(a)(12) (1994). Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904), has defmed "willful" to
mean deliberate or intentional; cases holding that a looser "reckless disregard" standard should be
applied were explicitly overruled. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 365 (1977).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 365(0) (1994). "In a case under chapter 11 of this title, the trustee (or debtor in
possession) shall be deemed to have assumed ... and shall immediately cure any deficit under, any
comminnent by the debtor to a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency ... to maintain the
capital of an insured depository institution ...." Id.
143. See discussion supra Part ill.B.
144. 12 U.S.C. § 18310(e)(2)(E) (1994).
145. 12 U.S.C. § 18310.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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also conserving the financial viability of the deposit insurance fund. This
statutory provision, which becomes effective whenever a bank subsidiary
becomes undercapitalized,'46 allows the parent company to make corrective interventions at its discretion. 147 The capital commitment is of a limited amount and arguably of limited duration. l48 If the parent company
chooses not to recapitalize the institution, the bank subsidiary may be
subject to stringent regulatory controls. 149
Congress, through PCA, provided managers of failing institutions
with an incentive to operate the bank with risk-free rather than high risk
strategies. ISO Requiring that more of a bank's capital be at risk, Congress
put more of bank shareholders' funds at risk as well as those of the insurance fund. The legislative intent also indicates that Congress meant to
give the parent company the option of selling, recapitalizing, or liquidating.1SI By requiring parent company intervention at the earliest indication of a decline in capital and by specifying the amount of the obligation, regulators exercise less discretion over the regulation of the institu-

146. A financial institution is subject to this provIsIon if it is categorized as either
undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, or critically undercapitalized. See FDICIA, 12
V.S.C. § 18310(b)(1). An institution falling in one of these three categories must submit a capital
restoration plan to its primary federal regulator in a timely manner. See 12 V.S.C. § 18310(e)(2). The
plan must explain in detail how the institution will rebuild capital, specifying year-to-year target
levels for capital growth. The plan must be based on realistic assumptions, describe activities that are
likely to succeed, and not expose the institution to appreciably increased risk. The plan must also
describe the types and levels of activities in which the institution will engage and contain such other
information as regulators require. When regulators classify a bank as undercapitalized, several
discretionary and mandatory corrective intervention actions take place. These corrective
interventions increase in severity as the institution's undercapitalization becomes more critical. See
12 V.S.C. § 18310.
147. The prompt corrective provision did not abolish the highly controversial regulatory tools
that regulators previously used to mandate the parent company's restoration of its bank subsidiary's
capital. See discussion supra Part II and accompanying notes.
148. The statute requires that the parent company infuse the amount necessary to bring the
institution into capital compliance "as of the time when the institution fails to comply with a [capital
restoration] plan .... " 12 V.S.c. § 183Io(e)(2)(E)(II). The parent company must also guarantee
compliance with the capital restoration plan for four consecutive quarters. 12 V.S.C. §
18310(e)(2)(C)(ii). The statute limits the amount of the guarantee liability to 5 percent of the
depository institution's total assets at the time it becomes undercapitalized, or the amount necessary
to bring the institution into compliance with all capital standards. 12 V.S.c. § 18310(e)(2)(E)(i); see
also Prompt Corrective Action, 57 Fed. Reg. 44,866, 44,902 (1992) (amending 12 C.F.R. §
325.104(h)(1 )(i» (explaining the final rules implementing the system of prompt corrective action as
established by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ».
149. See supra notes 85, 87.
150. Moral hazard describes the disincentive that deposit insurance provides for managers of a
failing institution to jeopardize the insurance fund while seeking profits for the institution. Because
the depositors' funds will be protected even if the institution fails, managers are willing to gamble
with the institution's funds in a high stakes, "win big or lose big" strategy, which, if the institution
loses, depletes its capital. See S. REP. No. 102-167, at 32-33 (1991).
151. Cf Eric J. Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much is Too Much? 16
ANN. REv. BANKING L. 311,350 (1997) (criticizing the regulatory agencies' various protections
against moral hazard and arguing that in the aggregate they amount to "regulatory overkill").
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tion should the parent company choose not to recapitalize the
institution. 152
A parent company may have chosen to shore up its undercapitalized
bank subsidiary under PCA. If the parent company becomes a debtor
under the Code, its decision to recapitalize its bank subsidiary will be
scrutinized and the transfer may be subject to an avoidance action.15J Although a PCA-type infusion may be a "regulatory-approved" asset transfer, as the BNE court described it, the present bankruptcy scheme undermines the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance. 154
IV. THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE RULE '55

While current provisions of the Bankruptcy Code give regulators
stronger enforcement mechanisms for capital obligations, they are juxtaposed against the Bankruptcy Code's preexisting statutory scheme regarding the avoidance of asset transfers. The BNE decisions left unclarifled a crucial issue: .When a bank holding company becomes a debtor
after making an asset transfer pursuant to regulatory authority, can that
transfer fmd protection in the bankruptcy scheme? Enforcement of the
capital maintenance obligations may pose a conflict between the interests
of the financial institution's creditors, which may include the appropriate
banking agency, and the institution's holding company's creditors, which
may include the same banking agency. A trustee of the holding company
may try to avoid a capital maintenance commitment or a payment to a
bank subsidiary as a fraudulent conveyance under section 548 of the
Code. '56 Only if the capital maintenance obligation falls within the good
152. The statute prevents an institution from paying dividends or management fees that cause
the institution to become undercapitalized as a result of the distribution. See FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. §
18310(d) (1994). As the Senate Report explains, this provision protects the insurance fund by
preventing institutions from depleting capital for the benefit of shareholders. See S. REp. No. 102167, at 35 (1991). An undercapitalized institution must submit within 45 days a capital restoration
plan and the regulatory agency must review that plan within 60 days. 12 U.S.C. § 18310(e)(2)(D).
See generally Richard S. Carnell, Prompt Co"ective Action Under the FDIC Improvement Act of
1991, in Litigating For and Against the FDIC and the RTC 1992, 27 (PLI, Cornrn. Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 625, 1992) (discussing the provisions of the Prompt Corrective
Action); Nina Cortell, Aspects of Financial Institutions Exposure, in Responsibility of the Corporate
Parent for the Activities of a Subsidiary 1990, 165 (PLI, Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 706, 1990) (discussing the financial institutions' regulatory framework as applied to the
parent/subsidiary relationship).
153. See II U.S.C. § 548 (1994).

154.

1d.

155. These rules apply with equal force to the trustee of a bankruptcy estate or to a debtor in
possession. Id.
156. Prior to the passage of the Crime Control Act in 1990, the payment of a capital obligation
after its breach raised an issue of the applicability of section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. This
provision allows the bankruptcy trustee to reduce the arnount of an asset transfer given by the debtor
to the creditor prior to bankruptcy if that creditor receives more than it would have been entitled to in
a Chapter 7 proceeding. 11 U.S.c. § 547(b) (1994). The Crime Control Act amended the Bankruptcy
Code to give any outstanding amount due under a capital maintenance obligation a higher priority
status. II U.S.C. § 507(a)(9) (1994). However, if the individual owners of the holding company are
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faith exception to this statutory provision will the regulatory agency be
successful in enforcing even the more specific capital maintenance obligation. ls7
The payment of a capital obligation, in part or in full, may raise an
ls8
issue of the applicability of section 548 of the Code. The Code does not
provide immunity for transfers made pursuant to regulatory orders. ls9
Section 548 provides the bankruptcy trustee with an avoidance remedy
for asset transfers made within one year of a debtor's bankruptcy filing. l60
If the trustee is successful in filing the avoidance petition, the trustee will
be able to augment the debtor's estate by the amount of the asset transfer
in question. 161
Section 548(a) provides the trustee with a remedy based upon actual
or constructive fraud. 162 Under section 548(a)(1), the actual fraud provision, also called the subjective test, the debtor bank holding company
must have made the asset transfers with the "actual intent to hinder, delay and defraud."I63 Arguably, the fact that regulatory agencies issue orders requiring capital obligations makes them involuntary transfers. l64
The trustee may elect not to proceed under the actual fraud provision
because that claim may be more difficult to prove. 165

responsible for funding the obligation and they use section 507 to secure a better priority, section
547 would apply and the trustee would have one year in which to recover the asset transfer as an
avoidable preference. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
157. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(e) (1994).
158. The trustee may also pursue an asset transfer challenge under state law pursuant to the
Unifonn Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 1918, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (amended by the
Unifonn Fraudulent Transfer Act of 1984, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985 & Supp. 1997». These statutes
incorporate the state law substantive and procedural requirements into the fraudulent conveyance
rule of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994). See generally Robert K. Rasmussen,
Guarantees and Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 194 (1985) (stating
that the focus of examination in determining whether a fraudulent transfer was made under section
548(a)(2) should be between the debtor and the obligor because it is the obligor, not the lender, that
benefits from the debtor's guarantee).
159. This was one of the arguments set forth by the trustee in the BNEC case. See supra Part
m.B and accompanying notes.
160. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994).
161. The trustee has one year following the avoidance of the transfer to initiate an action
against the transferee. 11 U.S.C. § 550(f) (1994).
162. See Michael L. Cook, Fraudulent Transfer Liability Under the Bankruptcy Code, 17
Hous. L. REv. 263, 270, 276-77 (1980) (characterizing actual fraud as a subjective test and
constructive fraud as an objective test).
163. 11 U.S.c. § 548(a)(I) (1994).
164. Breach of a capital maintenance obligation allows the appropriate regulatory agency to
issue a cease and desist order against the parent company under section 1818(0 and then proceed
with an administrative hearing. See supra Part D.A.2 and accompanying notes.
165. This section may in fact be applicable if the insiders of the parent holding company are
themselves liable for any capital deficiency. See John C. Deal et aI., Capital Punishment: The Death
Of Limited Liability For Shareholders Of Federally Regulated Financial Institutions, 24 CAP. U. L.
REv. 67, 124 (1995). Any transfers that a debtor bank holding company makes when it is nearing
insolvency may be problematic considering the fiduciary duties that directors may owe to creditors.
See infra Part IV.
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The involuntary payment of a capital obligation by a debtor bank
holding company may pose a less questionable claim under the test for
constructive fraud of section 548 (a)(2). Under this test, the trustee must
prove that the debtor bank holding company received "less than a reasonably equivalent value"l66 and, most likely, that the debtor bank holding company either was insolvent or was made insolvent due to the transfer or obligation. '67
The issue of fraudulent conveyance has had limited exposure in the
bank holding company context. Courts analyzing the issue in the holding
company context have engaged in a two-part analysis. Those courts look
fIrst to whether the parent company received an indirect benefit based
upon the transfer. Then, they assess the value of that benefIt. The discussion that follows analyzes 'recent cases addressing benefIt and value in
the holding company context. It then addresses the good faith defense.
The section concludes by analyzing these concepts in the bank holding
company context.
0

A. Evaluating the Asset Transfer: The Parent Company's Benefit

What underlies the section 548 requirement that a transferor receive
an exchange of reasonably equivalent value is the policy of the Bankruptcy Code to maintain the debtor's estate for the benefIt of its
creditors. '68 Consistent with this policy, the debtor's return benefIt may
be direct or indirect, but it must have a proportionate value. In the holding company context, the benefIt will most likely be an indirect one, and
measuring its equivalent value may depend on the [mancial position of
the subsidiary.
When a parent company makes an asset transfer to its subsidiary, it
is "downstreaming" assets to the subsidiary. This acceptable common
corporate practice increases the value of the subsidiary and, ultimately,
increases the parent company's net worth. l69 Thus, although the parent
166. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994).
167. See supra note 71.
168. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy Making in an Imperfect World, 92
MICH. L. REv. 336 (1993) (discussing the conflicting policy objectives of the bankruptcy system and
arguing for a careful assessment of the presumptions underlying those objectives when considering
reforms).
169. Intercorporate guarantees are essentially third-party contracts. In addition to the
"downstream" guarantee, there is an "upstream" guarantee by a subsidiary of its parent's debt and a
"cross-stream" guarantee by a corporation of an affiliated corporation's debt. See Rasmussen, supra
note 158, at 207 (1985).
In the bankruptcy context, courts apply a third-party beneficiary test when determining
whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent value from an intercorporate guarantee. Under
this analysis, cross-stream and upstream guarantees do not meet the benefit test· unless the
corporations have failed to maintain separate corporate identities, thereby allowing the court to
disregard corporate separateness and treat the corporations as a single entity. See generally Jack F.
Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied to Intercorporate
Guarantees: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, ° 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1403 (1994)
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company may not receive a direct exchange of value, it should eventually
benefit from the transfer. 170

B. Evaluating the Asset Transfer: Measuring "Reasonable Equivalence,,171
A guarantee is a fmancing vehicle that commits a non-borrower to
agree to repay a loan in the event of a default by the borrower. Typically,
a parent company will guarantee an obligation of a subsidiary. The value
of these transactions is difficult to assess because the transfer may involve indirect benefits. Courts may use either the net worth maintenance
or the identity of interest doctrines when reviewing whether the debtor
holding company has made a permissible transfer.
1. The Net Worth Maintenance Theory
Using the net worth maintenance theory to decide whether the parent company has received an indirect benefit depends on the financial
condition of the subsidiary. The leading case interpreting the holding
company's benefit using the net worth maintenance theory is Rubin v.
Manufacturer Hanover Trust CO.172 The Second Circuit ruled that determining whether the debtor holding company has received an economic
benefit begins by determining whether the holding company's guarantee
of its subsidiary's debt has maintained the financial position of the subsidiary.173
The Court of Appeal's ruling reversed the district court, which did
not consider the fmancial condition of the subsidiary.174 Instead, the court
concluded that the debtor holding company had a "vital interest" in the
financial affairs of its affiliate. Under that analysis, the district court
found that the debtor holding company always received an indirect benefit when it guaranteed its subsidiary's 10an.17S

(discussing the intercorporate guarantee. downstream guarantee. upstream guarantee. and crossstream guarantee); Barry L. Zaretsky. Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk.
46 S.c. L. REv. 1165 (1995) (discussing the development of fraudulent transfer law and constructive
law provisions).
170. The parent company may only receive an exchange of value when its subsidiary is solvent.
See supra note 6.
171. 11 U.S.c. § 548 (a)(2)(A) (1994).
172. 661 F.2d 979. 991-92 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that even though a bankrupt corporation had
guaranteed loans that the bank issued to its subsidiary. trustees of the bankrupt corporation brought
suit against the bank to recover the value of certain funds and securities of the corporation that the
corporation had given as collateral for those loans). Rubin was decided under the section 67(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. which arguably was unchanged by the Bankruptcy Code. See also Harman
v. First Am. Bank of Md .• 956 F.2d 479. 485 (4th Cir. 1991) (fmding Rubin's indirect benefit rule
applicable under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code).
173. Rubin. 661 F.2d at 991.
174. [d. at 993.
175. Rubin v. Manufactures Hanover Trust Co., 4 B.R. 447. 456-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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The Second Circuit's analysis of indirect benefit focused on comparing the obligation given to the third party with the obligation assumed
by the holding company.176 To result in a benefit, the exchange between
the holding company and the parent company must correlate. In Following this analysis, an equivalent nexus shores up the benefit to the holding
company, and thereby makes the transfer permissible.
Mter the decision in Rubin, several courts adopted the approach of
evaluating the subsidiary's fmancial position as a result of the parent
company's transfer. In light of this, courts began considering the degree
or the nature of the subsidiary's insolvency. In Duque Rodriguez v.
Avanca (In re Rodriguez),178 the "deep insolvency" of the subsidiary supported a determination that the debtor parent company would not receive
a benefit and that the parent company's asset transfer decreased the
holding company's own net worth, harming the holding company's
creditors. 179 Elaborating on the bankruptcy court's conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit l80 affirmed that the "terminal insolvency" of the subsidiary
controlled the parent company's choice in paying the subsidiary's debt.
The lack of financial viability of the subsidiary meant that the parent
company's contribution on behalf of the subsidiary would not sustain the
subsidiary's net worth. ISI Given that ultimate result, the parent company
would never receive a benefit and the transfers were voidable under section 548. 182

176. Rubin, 661 F.2d at 991-93.
177. Id. at 989 (holding that there must be an approximate worth between the benefit received
and the obligation exchanged).
178. 77 B.R. 937, 939 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (relying on 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2). the trustee of
a bankrupt corporation sought avoidance of the transfer of $42,000 from the corporation to the
defendant, which was made two months prior to the commencement of bankruptcy action). The
courts have considered the degree of insolvency of the subsidiary in determining the parent
company's benefit after paying a subsidiary company's obligation. Id.
179. "In view of General Coffee's then terminal insolvency. the net worth of Domino was
diminished by the transfer and the innocent creditors of Domino were in fact harmed by the
transfer." Rodriquez. 77 B.R. at 939.
180. Rodriguez v. Murphy (In re Rodriguez), 895 F.2d 725, 728-29 (11th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that a trustee brought action to render certain payments made by a holding company to a
defendant on behalf of its subsidiary's trustee contending that the debtor holding company did not
receive "reasonably equivalent value" for payments and the court emphasized that the decisive issue
is whether by paying its subsidiary's debt. the holding company received an economic benefit that
was sufficient to preserve the holding company's net worth); see also Butcher v. First Nat'l Bank (In
re Butcher), 57 B.R. 101 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.) rev'd on other grounds, 78 B.R. 520 (1986)
(examining a trustee's filed action against First National Bank seeking to avoid preferential and
alleged fraudulent transfers to creditors however, the complaint was dismissed on grounds that the
action was time barred by the statute of limitations).
181. "Only if Domino shared in the enjoyment of either of these benefits can the payments have
conferred an 'economic benefit' upon Domino such that its net worth was preserved by the
payments." Rodriguez, 895 F.2d at 728.
182. Id. at 726-28.
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2. The Identity of Interest
The identity of interest or enterprise doctrine evaluates whether the
parent company and its subsidiary have combined their operations or
enterprise in such a way that their financial condition is indistinguishable. 183 When this occurs, the parent company will undoubtedly receive
an indirect benefit. 184
Under this theory, courts are more concerned with the actual operations of the parent and subsidiary corporations as opposed to their legal
status. l8.5 If the corporations are commonly controlled and behave as
though they are one enterprise rather than as a related group,l86 bankruptcy law allows the combination of the two corporations. 187 Disregarding the corporate separateness of a parent company and its bank subsidiary will benefit the subsidiary's creditors to the disadvantage of the parent company's creditors. The asset transfer made by the holding company would thereby have a greater priority than the other debts of the
holding company. As with the net worth theory, there must be a defmable benefit to the debtor holding company.
183. See generally J. Stephen Gilbert, Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer, 43
VAND. L. REv. 2Cfl (1990) (explaining the requirements for substantive consolidation and its
consequenses in bankruptcy proceedings); Patrick C. Sargent, Bankruptcy Remote Finance
Subsidiaries: The Substantive Consolidation Issue, 44 Bus. LAW. 1223 (1989) (asserting that when
analyzing substantive consolidation of a parent company and its subsidiary, court should identify
whether the subsidiary is a separate entity or just an extension of the parent company); William H.
Thornton, The Continuing Presumption Against Substantive Consolidation, 105 BANKING L.J. 448
(1988) (arguing against substantive consolidation of a parent company and its subsidiary in
bankruptcy).
184. McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 420
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970). Trustee brought action to recover alleged fraudulent transfers by debtor to
defendant. The court found that proceeds of a loan made by defendant to a subsidiary company
formerly owned by defendant's father were placed in debtor's account, thus allowing debtor to
postpone the date of bankruptcy. Therefore, payments made by debtor to defendant were not
fraudulent becaUse of the indirect benefit conferred on debtor by placement of the loan in its
account. But see Jones v. National City Bank of Rome (In re Greenbrook Carpet Co.), 722 F.2d 659
(11th Cir. 1984). Although the bank knew that a loan given to bankrupt company in satisfaction of a
security interest held by the bank would be used for the benefit of a subsidiary company which the
bank had refused to make a loan, such knowledge did not render payments by debtor fraudulent
transfers. The court found that the transfer between the debtor and the defendant-bank were
supported by fair consideration. Id. at 661.
185. Enterprise liability, considered primarily a tort law doctrine, places liability for negligence
arising out of the enterprise on the owners of the enterprise. See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of
Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1266 (1997); Robert L. Rabin, Some
Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REv. 1190 (1996).
186. This is a common practice in the banking industry among related subsidaires that may
engage in such transactions within the specific reglatory context.
187. The bank regulatory agencies have authority under both the Bankruptcy Code and FDICIA
to use similar powers. Under section 5Cfl of the Bankruptcy Code, unfulfilled capital maintenance
obligations receive a higher priority then other unsecured debts. 11 U.S.c. § 5Cfl (1994). Thus, if a
bank holding company files a bankruptcy petition, the regulatory agency will be entitled to receive a
portion of the bankrupt's estate to satisfy this obligation. Similarly, FDICIA's prompt corrective
action provision authorizes the appropriate regulatory agency to request an assurance of capital
maintenance before its bank subsidiary becomes insolvent. See supra note 105.
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If the downstream transfer of assets depends on the financial position of the subsidiary in order to be an avoidable transfer, the trustee will
be successful in avoiding the transactions. The pre-bankruptcy use of
funds by a debtor holding company, even if made in compliance with
regulatory orders, violates the bankruptcy policy of preserving the estate
of the debtor for the equal treatment of all creditors. Even if the transfer
were for less than a "reasonably equivalent value," the trustee seeking to
avoid it must prove that, as a result of that transaction, the debtor company was financially weakened.
C. The Debtor's Financial Status after the Transfer

A court evaluating the financial status of a debtor after it has made a
transfer for less than reasonably equivalent value has a choice of three
tests. The court may determine the value of the company by determining
whether as a result of the transfer 1) the transferor was insolvent or rendered insolvent, 2) the transferor was left with unreasonably small capital, or 3) the transferor intended to incur debts beyond its ability to pay
them. '88 The tests are specific and their results depend on the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The Code gives a court great flexibility in choosing the applicable test.
1. The Transferor was Insolvent or Rendered Insolvent
The insolvency test requires an assessment of the debtor's capital at
the time of the transfer. The court's choice and application of a measure
are crucial to determining the validity of the transfer. '89 Courts commonly
choose either a going concern value or a liquidation value. '90
The going concern measure evaluates the business assets as a composite. This measure evaluates the present and future earnings potential
of those assets and includes an assessment of the firm's contingent li-

188. Subsection 548(a)(2)(a)-(B)(iii) is often viewed as a substitute for the actual fraud
provision of section 548(a)(1) because it requires a lower standard of proof. Although both types of
cases are difficult to prove, section 548(a)(2)(a)-(B)(iii) requires only the debtor's subjective belief
that it would be unable to pay its debts. See supra note 6.
189. The party seeking to avoid the transfer has the burden of proof of establishing the
insolvency of the company as a result of the transfer. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro
Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 650 (3d. Cir. 1991) (stating once creditor had met burden of
proving its secured status, debtor had burden of proving that transfer was avoidable as preference);
First Nat'l Bank v. Minnesota Uti!. Contracting, Inc. (In re Minnesota Uti!. Contracting, Inc.), 110
B.R. 41'4, 419 (D. Minn. 1990) (explaining trustee of bankrupt company has burden of proving each
element of fraudulent transfer claim by preponderance of the evidence); Ohio Corrugating Co. v.
DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 B.R. 430, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (holding
creditor committee failed to sustain its burden of proving that debtor was insolvent even though
reconstituted balance sheet indicated that debtor was insolvent at the time of the leveraged buyout).
190. See James F. Queenan, Jr., The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in
Bankruptcy, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. I, 16 (1989) (discussing the different methods of valuation).
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abilities. '91 Its objective is to make a fair market value assessment, unless
such an assessment would be unwarranted because the debtor is wholly
inoperative. '92 Its projection is based on obtaining a multiple of a ratio of
stock proceeds to earnings for a similar business and the debtor's current
annual earning capacity.'93
A liquidation value measure operates from the premise that the
business is decreasing its capital base by selling its assets in a piecemeal
fashion. '94 Most courts are reluctant to use the liquidation measure if the
business is still a going concern, fearing that its use will result in an in195
adequate assessment. Courts use this measure only if the business
l96
clearly lacks an ability to generate revenue.
2. The Transferor was Left with Unreasonably Small Capital
The test of whether the debtor had "unreasonably small capital"
after the transfer is a test of capitalization. The court "examines the relationship, if any, between the amount of capital remaining in the business
in the period after the transfer and the business ability to continue operations during that period in the same manner as it conducted them
before. ,,197 Essentially a court analyzes the debtor's fmancial projections
to decide if they are reasonable. The party challenging the asset transfer
will be successful if she is able to prove that either the debtor's cash flow
was insufficient or the transferee relied upon unreasonable fmancial
198
projections.
There is in the bankruptcy regime a sole exception to a claim of
fraudulent conveyance based on the good faith of the receiving party.
The next section examines how courts have interpreted that provision.

191. In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 200 (7th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that
contingent liabilities must be reduced to their present value); cj. Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Oppenheim, 440 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (treating the guarantee as matured and not
reducing it).
192. Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp., 56 B.R. 339, 385-86 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985), affd in part and remanded in part, 850 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1988) (using balance sheets
prepared on a going concern); Fryman v. Century Factors, 93 B.R. 333, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
193. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647 (3d Cir. 1991); In
re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc., 100 B.R. 127, 132 (D. Mass. 1989); Bergquist, 56 B.R. at 386.
194. Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust, 960 F.2d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 1992); In re
Bellanca Aircraft, 56 B.R. 339 (D. Minn. 1985).
195. Covey,960F.2dat661.
196. Id. at 661. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that before using a liquidation
value under section 548(a)(2)(B)(l), a court should ask "What would a buyer be willing to pay for a
debtor's entire package of assets and liabilities?" A positive price indicates that the firm is solvent
and a going concern value should be used; a negative price indicates that the firm is insolvent and a
liquidation value should be used. Id.
197. Barrett v. Continental m. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 882 F.2d I, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing
Widett v. George, 148 N.E.2d 172 (Mass. 1958».
198. Murphy v. Meritor Sav. Bank, 126 B.R. 370, 407 (D. Mass. 1991); Credit Managers Ass'n
v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
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D. The Good Faith Defense

While the trustee seeking to avoid an asset transfer will have the
burden of proof, the transferee may meet that challenge with a good faith
defense under section 548(c).I99 This exception to the fraudulent conveyance rule forecloses a trustee's right to recover property from a transferee
who received the transfer "for value and in good faith."2°O The defense
allows an inquiry into the recipient's good faith. Specifically, the trans.feree must show that it gave a fair consideration, which may have been
less than "reasonably equivalent," in good faith. 201 Thus, while the "reasonably equivalent value" standard is strictly an inquiry regarding worth,
the good faith exception also focuses on the fairness of the exchange. 2m
When a court applies the good faith exception, it first must make a
determination that a fair consideration was exchanged.203 The court engages in the same "value" assessment discussed regarding reasonably
equivalent value.204

199. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) provides in relevant part:
Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section is voidable
under section 544, 545, or 547 ... a transferee ... that takes for value and in good faith
has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation
incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to
the debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation.
11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1994). Subsection (d)(2)(a) defmes value as: "property, or satisfaction or
securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise
to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor" II U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1994). See
generally Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725 (1984)
(discussing the policies that support a trustee's avoiding powers). The courts have not provided a
clear defmition of how the value of the obligation that a parent company has incurred on behalf of its
subsidiary should be measured. Cf. RAsMUSSEN, supra note 158. Rasmussen argues that the
reasonable equivalence measure under section 548(a)(2) actually creates two separate categories of
transactions. One category evaluates a transaction that decreased the debtor's net worth because the
debtor did not receive a reasonably equivalent value. The other category evaluates the transaction to
determine whether it impaired the rights of the debtor's creditors. Id.
200. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1994).
201. Id.
202. The Code repealed the explicit requirement of good faith founded in the earlier statute. See
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67(d), 30 Stat. 544, 564 (1898) (amended by Chandler Act, ch.
575, § 67(d), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (repealed 1978». Section 548 now requires that the
conveyance have a 'reasonably equivalent' value. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (d)(2)(A) (1994).
203. McColley v. Rosenberg, 76 B.R. 342, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining that no
consideration was exchanged where transfers were made to principal of a corporation and his family
without ever benefitting the corporation); In re Jacobs, 60 B.R. 811, 815 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (stating
that where no consideration was exchanged at the time of the transfer, transferee may not assert good
faith exception); Consumers Credit Union v. Widett, 29 B.R. 673, 675 (D. Mass. 1983) (fmding
transferee, who was aware of borrower's solvency, and who exchanged reasonably equivalent value,
but took a security interest in debtor's property, as not meeting the burden of proof). See generally
Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARv. L. REv. 495 (1983) (arguing that courts
have expanded the applicability of the good faith component of the test, with some courts even using
it inappropriately in place of an assessment of whether fair consideration was exchanged).
204. In re American Lumber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 B.R. 470, 477 (D. Minn. 1980) (stating
that a good faith transfer must have "earmarks" of an ann's length transaction).
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The rule requires a court to make a factual determination regarding
the transferee's intent to hinder or defraud creditors. 2M The court must
examine the bargaining situation surrounding the transaction to determine whether the transferee knew of the debtor's weakened financial
condition.206 That test varies from circuit to circuit; most courts do not
require actual knowledge, but will charge a transferee with a "reason to
know" standard if the transferee's failure to draw the inference would
result in bad faith.207
Some courts analyze the transferee's intent by determining whether
the transferee actually knew or should have known that the transaction
would be damaging to creditors. 208 The issue of the transferee's knowledge is always a factual inquiry.209

205. In re American Lumber Co., 5 B.R. at 477; In re Jacobs, 60 B.R. at 814-15.
206. In re S & W Exporters, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 16 B.R. 941,946 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (rmding
that a debtor's receipt of reasonably equivalent value did not protect conveyance from avoidance
where transferee had knowledge, actual and/or inferred, of debtor's "unfavorable fmancial
condition").
207. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1304 (3rd Cir. 1986) (adopting
an imputed knowledge standard); In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., 22 B.R. 86, 90-91 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
("Good faith may be lacking because of a transferee's knowledge of a transferor's unfavorable
financial condition at the time of the transfer."); Consumers Credit Union, 29 B.R. at 677 (citing
McWilliams v. Edmonson, 162 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1947) (stating that a "lender's knowledge of
borrower~s insolvency prohibits a finding that he is a good faith transferee"». Most courts are
willing to find good faith if the conveyance is a payment on an antecedent debt. Boston Trading
Group, Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508-09, 1512-13 (1st Cir. 1987).
208. In re Maddalena, 176 B.R. 551, 555 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that good faith is an
objective test requiring that transferee either knew or should have known that transaction was
deceptive).
209. Several courts have adopted the factors suggested in the decision In re Southern Industrial
Bank Corp., 99 B.R. 827 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.), aff d, 115 B.R. 930 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). They are:
First, were the transactions at issue within the ordinary course of the defendants'
business? ...
Second, what was the nature and extent of the defendant's relationship with the debtor? If
the defendant had an established or insider relationship with the debtor, the defendant's
good faith is less likely ....
Third, what did the defendant know or what should the defendant have known about the
effect that the transactions at issue would have on the debtor and its creditors? If the
defendant knew or should have known that the transaction would have an adverse effect
on the debtor and its creditors, good faith will be difficult to show ....
Sub-issues here might include:
(A) Was the transaction in the ordinary course of the debtor's business? If it was not, then
there is a greater likelihood of an adverse effect on creditors, and the defendant should
probably exercise greater care.
(B) What information was available to the defendant regarding the debtor's insolvency?
If information was available indicating insolvency, it would be less likely that the
defendant acted in good faith.
Fourth, did the defendant violate any legal or professional ethical duties in the transaction
at issue? If so, good faith will be more difficult to establish.
Fifth, did the defendant improperly retain any of the property or otherwise benefit from
the transactions at issue? ...
Sixth, did the defendant participate in the transaction with an honest and innocent
intention?
Id. at 839-39 (internal citations omitted).
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In the bank holding context, the good faith defense requires an examination of the relationship between the debtor parent company and its
capital-deficient bank subsidiary.2lO Although the parent company may
have received an indirect benefit by virtue of the transfer, it is the bank
subsidiary, and explicitly its creditors including the insurance fund, that
must quantify that benefit as well as prove an absence of bad faith.

E. The Parent Company's Indirect Benefit: Forbearance from Regulatory Action
The theories that allow a debtor parent company to make a protected
pre-bankruptcy transfer to its subsidiary require an enhancement of the
parent company's financial status.211 Both the identity of interest and net
worth theories recognize an indirect benefit to a debtor parent company
when it makes a pre-bankruptcy transfer to its solvent subsidiary.212
Similarly, the good faith exception allows an inquiry into the parent
company's good faith in making the transfer, while still requiring that
there be a quantifiable exchange of value.213 Under either of the theories,
the value of the indirect benefit to the debtor bank holding company
when it makes a transfer to its financially troubled bank subsidiary is
somewhat problematic.
The parent company's capital contribution restores value to the bank
subsidiary.214 The restoration of value at the subsidiary level directly
benefits its creditors as well as the insurance fund. The bank holding
company regulatory scheme promotes the capital infusion, because, by
dermition, the parent company and its affiliated subsidiaries share an
identity of interest.21S The regulatory scheme also implicitly sanctions the
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a different standard. Gilmer v. Woodson, 332
F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964) (stating that a transferee's good faith is not challenged if the conveyance
was for an antecedent debt rather than for a present consideration). The Southern Industrial factors
have limited application under a Gilmer test. Gilmer, 332 F.2d at 548.
210. In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., 22 B.R. at 90. The court stated:
The term, 'good faith,' does not merely mean the opposite of the phrase 'actual intent to
defraud.' That is to say, an absence of fraudulent intent does not mean that the transaction
was necessarily entered into in good faith. The lack of good faith imports a failure to deal
honestly, fairly and openly.
Id. (citation omitted).
211. See discussion supra note 33 (discussing operation of the net worth maintenance or
enterprise theory).
212. See discussion supra note 33 and infra Part V.B.
213. In re Wes Dor, 996 F.2d 237, 242 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that inquiries into whether a
"quantifiable exchange of value" occurred is largely a question of fact to which considerable latitude
must be given to the trier of fact, and affmning the bankruptcy court's finding that "quantifiable
exchange of value" includes the securing of an antecedent debt of a wholly-owned subsidiary by a
bank through the parent company).
214. In re Carrousel Motels, Inc., 160 B.R. 993, 1000 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
215. See In re Carrousel Motels, Inc., 160 B.R. at 1000. See also Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 251-52 (1978). The Court stated:
The Board has frequently reiterated that holding companies should be a source of
strength to subsidiary financial institutions. It has used the substantial advantages of bank
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transfer between the parent company and the direct beneficiaries, i.e., the
bank subsidiary's creditors, including the insurance fund. The banking
regulatory structure, by permitting the parent company to serve as a
proxy for liability upon the bank subsidiary's decline, creates the identity
of interest between the parent company and the bank subsidiary's creditors. 216 Yet, because the parent company receives only an indirect benefit,
the good faith exception mandates a fair value for the transaction. The
existing banking regulatory structure does not provide a different measure for the proxy arrangement. The difficulty in quantifying the mandated indirect exchange suggests the need for an alternative approach in
the banking context.
V.

CRAFTING A BANK EXCEPTION TO THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
PROVISION

The banking regulatory structure arguably requires parent companies to make an asset transfer or capital infusion that the Code labels a
fraudulent conveyance. The existing bankruptcy regime does not protect
a pre-bankruptcy parent company asset transfer. 217 The dormant conflict
raises the issue of how these two bodies should authorize the debtor parent company's pre-bankruptcy transfers to its insolvent subsidiary.218
Examining the economic identities of the parent and its bank subsidiary is crucial to resolving the conflict. This proposal recommends
amending the Code to include a banking enterprise exception, which has
a three-pronged effect. First, the exception explicitly recognizes the singular nature of banking conglomerates operating collectively with the

holding-company status to induce applicants to improve their own and their subsidiaries'
capital positions. . . . Congress has been apprised of this consistent administrative
practice, ... and has not undertaken to change it
Id. (citations omitted).
216. In re Carrousel Motels, Inc., 160 B.R. at 1000.
217. The enforceability of the capital restoration plan is unaffected by whether the bankruptcy
of the parent company precedes that of the banking subsidiary. In MCorp, both the parent company
and the majority of its bank subsidiaries were insolvent when the Federal Reserve Board issued the
regulatory orders requiring the parent company to make the transfers. See discussion supra Part
D.A.B. To the contrary, the insolvency of BNE preceded the insolvency of BNEC by several
months. BNEC was book solvent when the banking regulators required it to make capital infusion
into BNE. See discussion supra note 71.
218. Although Congress intended through the prompt corrective action provision to enact a
more enforceable capital maintenance obligation, it may have created a more scurrilous one. The
source of strength condition, arguably, is mandatory, not discretionary. Failure to comply with the
regulatory agency orders regarding source of strength has resulted in issuance of cease and desist
orders for engaging in an unsafe and unsound banking practice under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b). See
discussion supra note 96 (noting that the Federal Reserve issued orders to parent company of failing
bank subsidiaries requesting transfers pursuant to source of strength requirement).
To the contrary, the prompt corrective action provision, arguably, is discretionary. The parent
company decides to submit a capital restoration plan for regulatory review, yet its failure to comply
with the approved plan would subject the parent company and the bank subsidiary to regulatory
sanctions. See supra note 151 and accompanying discussion.
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sanctioned use of federally insured funds. 219 Second, it is consistent with
the Code's overall goal to provide an equitable distribution of the
debtor's estate to its creditors. 22o Finally, it provides a balance of power
between the FDIC-Receiver and the bankruptcy court regarding the review function of the asset transfer.221 The unique structure of the banking
industry requires this specific change to balance the parent company's
use of the bank subsidiary funding in order to protect the business decision of the parent company to make the transfer and to limit the powers
of the FDIC-Receiver.
A. The Proposal: The Banking Enterprise Exception

The banking enterprise exception to the fraudulent conveyance provision offers protection from a trustee's avoidance action to recover a
pre-bankruptcy asset transfer to a failed bank subsidiary.222 It provides the
federal banking agency with a defense for the parent company's decision
to shore up an insolvent bank subsidiary upon a showing that the parent
company, and its bank and nonbank subsidiaries operated as an economic unit. 223 Upon a showing of an economic enterprise operation, the
bankruptcy court must recognize the deposit insurance fund as a valid
transferee and may not enter an order to return the asset transfer to the
debtor parent company's estate.224 This fmding also limits the actions of
the bankruptcy trustee. The trustee of a debtor parent company may not
file an avoidance action against FDIC-Corporate as a subsequent transferee of pre-bankruptcy assets.225 Additionally, the proposed change
would eliminate the FDIC-Receiver's review function as to these particular assets, except to provide a certification stating the amount of the
asset transfers, thereby allowing for an offset or credit of any crossguarantee assessment that may be imposed against a solvent bank subsidiary in the enterprise. 226 The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the
claim, reviewing it for legal sufficiency. Thus, the powers of the administrative agency are more properly aligned with those of the bankruptcy
court.

219. See discussion infra Part V.A.
220. See discussion infra Part V.B.
221. See discussion infra Part V.C.
222. See generally Branch v. F.D.I.e., 825 F. Supp 384 (D. Mass. 1993).
223. BNE-I, 825 F. Supp. at 384.
224. Id.
225. This rmding would also provide avoidance action protection to any subsequent purchaser
of holding company assets.
226. See infra note 229.
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B. Inter-Affiliate Transactions as Routine Business Practice
Banking laws allow the banking conglomerate to operate as a single
economic enterprise.227 However, because the regulatory structure does
not mandate that the parent company pool its affiliate funds to reduce
losses, the permissive regulatory structure can contribute to a bank subsidiary's failure. 228
•
The regulatory process provides a limited policing mechanism to
govern the transactions between a bank subsidiary and its affiliates. Section 23 is the statutory scheme that regulates transactions between affiliates. 229 Section 23A regulates the parent company's potential for abusive
conduct in transactions between bank and nonbank subsidiary corporations. 230 Section 23B establishes the standards for the terms and conditions of affiliate transactions.2JI
Transactions between commonly owned bank and nonbank subsidiaries must meet qualitative and quantitative requirements. The qualitative
restrictions result in a fair market exchange of value, including requirements of full collateralization and no individual transaction exceeding 10
percent of the bank subsidiary's capital and surplus. 232 The quantitative
227. See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in
Determining Parent and Subsidary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REv. 295 (1996). Pooling
profits is equivalent to the bank maintaining subsidiary's capital if the parent company has used the
banking subsidiaries assets for other subsidiaries. However, if the parent company has made
transfers among bank and nonbank subsidiaries, the interests of the FDIC may not be protected. Id.
at 326.
228. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994) (explaining that the cross-guarantee provision addresses this
issue in part when the bank fails by allowing the FDIC to assess liability for the cost of the failure of
an institution against commonly owned bank subsidiaries).
229. Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371c, applicable to all national banks
and FDIC insured institutions, identified certain types of transactions between affiliates as risky, e.g.,
,loans, credit, various forms of financial support, and limits the institution's use of capital for these
transactions. Originally passed in 1933 as part of the Bank Act of 1933 (Glass-Stegall Act), it
evidenced the concern that commercial banks and investments should be separate. In the Bank
Affiliate Act of 1982, Congress specifically amended the provision to allow more flexibility and
movement of funds. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1994).
230. The statute defmes "affiliate" generally as any company that controls the bank or any other
company that is controlled by the company or shareholders that controls the bank. "Control" is
deemed to exist with direct or indirect ownership of or power to vote 25 percent or more of any class
of voting security of a company, control over the election of a majority of the directors of a
company, or the exercise of a controlling influence over the management and policies of a company,
as determined by the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(3)(A) (1994). See 12 U.S.c. § 371c-l(d)
(1994) (generally incorporating into Section 23B the defmitions set forth in Section 23A); see also
12 C.F.R. § 563.41(b)(3)(i)(B) (1997) (regulation applicable to savings associations specifying
additional circumstances under which "control" may be found). 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(I) (1994). The
"affiliate" defmition also includes any company of which a majority of the directors also constitute a
majority of the directors of the institution or any company that controls the institution. 12 U.S.c. §
371c(b) (1994).
231. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-a (1994).
232. Section 23A is one of several regulations that monitors the conduct of the parent company
regarding its bank subsidiary. Congress has identified, and circumscribed the parent company's
potential for abusive conduct in several critical areas. These include capital adequacy regUlations as
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restrictions have a similar scope of protectiveness. Those provisions restrict the bank subsidiary's total interaffiliate transactions to no more
than 20 percent of its capital and surplus.233 Within these limitations,
however, the bank and nonbank subsidiaries may operate as a single enterprise. 234 Section 23A arguably favors transactions between bank subsidiaries owned by the same parent company.m The so-called "sisterbank" exemption excuses 80 percent of commonly controlled bank subsidiaries from complying with the quantitative limitations of section
23A. 236 Section 23B broadens the scope of section 23A in its inclusion of
"covered transactions,,237 and by requiring that the terms and circumstances of a transaction with a bank subsidiary be on as favorable terms
238
as those to comparable institutions, or in good faith.
Transactions between subsidiaries may benefit the entire
enterprise.239 They provide operational flexibility, such as easing geo-

addressed in 12 u.s.c. § 2154 (1994); insider loans in 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1994); and removing wealth
from the bank in 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). Section 23 specifically addresses transactions between a
nonbank affiliate subsidiary and a bank subsidiary.
Of the several restrictions addressing the quality of the assets, the requirements include that
the interaffiliate transaction be: 1) not of "low-quality," 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(3) (1994); 2) on terms
and conditions consistent with safe and sound banking practices, 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(IO) (1994);
and 3) secured by collateral having a value of at least 100 percent of the amount loaned, 12 U.S.C. §
371c(bX4) (1994). The statute prohibits a banking subsidiary from any individual transaction that
exceeds 10 percent of its capital and swplus. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(1)(A) (1994).
233. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(B) (1994). 12 U.S.C. § 23(d)(I) (1994).
234. 12 U.S.C. section 371c(a)(1XB) (1994 & 12 U.S.C. section 23(d)(1) (1994).
235. Section 23A will not prohibit transactions between commonly owned bank subsidiaries if
they do not involve low-quality assets. See 12 U.S.C. § 371 c(d)(I) (1994). See generally Veryl
Victoria Miles, Banking Affiliate Regulation Under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 105
BANKING LJ. 476 (1988).
236. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(d)(4) (1994).
237. Covered transactions with affiliates also include (1) sale of assets or securities to an
affiliate, (2) the payment of money or the furnishing of services to an affiliate under contract, lease,
or otherwise, (3) any transaction in which an affiliate acts as agent or broker or receives a fee for its
services to the institution or any other person, and (4) any transaction (or series of transactions) with
a third party if an affiliate has a fmancial interest in the third party or is a participant in the
transaction or series of transactions. 12 U.S.c. § 371c-l(a)(2) (1994).
238. See Orders Issued Under Section 4 of the BanJc Holding Company Act Metrocorp, Inc., 79
Fed. Res. Bull. 352 (April 1993). The Federal Reserve rejected Metrocorp's proposal to engage in
nonbanking activity through its affiliate, MAC, because approval of such proposal would be in
violation of, and inconsistent with, section 23B which was intended to prevent unsafe or unsound
banking practices. The Board found that Metrocorp could not have in good faith provided services to
an unaffiliated armored car service without determining the actual cost of such services, but
nonetheless charging a flat fee. See also FDIC v. Benson, 867 F. Supp. 512 (S.D. Tex. 1994). The
FDIC brought suit against officers and directors of bank for their alleged negligence in connection
with bank loans. As receiver for insolvent bank, FDIC has same rights and privileges of creditors,
shareholders and depositors, therefore by suing the defendants, FDIC was acting in its capacity as
bank's subrogee. However, absent proof that defendants knew of actual fraud or concealment, Texas
business judgment rule protects the defendants from liability. Id.
239. The bank regulators become aware of violations of Rule 23A and 23B only during the
examination process. That process is itself bifurcated. The FDIC, OTS, and
are the examiners
of the bank subsidiary and the Federal Reserve is responsible for the parent company and any
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graphical restrictions and lowering the cost of obtaining loans for the
bank subsidiary. The bank subsidiary is a ready purchaser of loans to
increase its asset portfolio, and the nonbanking subsidiary is a willing
seller to meet cash flow needs. 240
Although a parent company routinely uses the bank subsidiary's
low-cost funds, its conduct is not defensible as profit-maximizing for the
bank subsidiary under certain circumstances. Abusive parent company
conduct may include: 1) relying on core deposits for group funding
needs; 2) making loans from banking operations; 3) allowing a bank subsidiary to have a temporary liquidity crisis, thereby requiring borrowing
from the Federal Reserve; 4) placing new profit-generating enterprises in
nonbank subsidiaries; 5) allowing a nonbank subsidiary to purchase services from banks at low or no profit margins; or 6) allocation of bank profits, including distribution of dividends and new loans to nonbank opera241
tions.
Supporting the statutory scheme allowing the use of bank subsidiary
funds is the presumption that the examination process will deter the parent company from engaging in, or will detect the parent company's atnonbank subsidiary. Failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 23A and 23B may result in
enforcement proceedings based on violation of safety and soundness standards or in civil monetary
penalties for the bank's management. See discussion of section 1818 supra Part II.A.2. Although the
Federal Reserve has primary authority to interpret 12 C.F.R. § 250.250, OTS, OCC, and FDIC,
because of their primary jurisdiction over depository institutions, also construe this regulation as
well as Sections 23A and 23B. See Joseph P. Daly, Asset Purchases from Affiliates: The Federal
ReseTW!'s Interpretive Exemption from Limits on Affiliate Transactions, 113 BANKING LJ. 601
(1996).
240. See Sean J. Geary, The Credit Transaction, in Basics of Banking Law 1991, at 197 (PLI,
Comm. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 593, 1990).
241. A transaction involving a bank subsidiary and its nonbank affiliate may not be readily
identifiable and would not necessarily be detected in the examination process. A former banking
regulator, who favored tighter controls of transactions under Section 23, has outlined the potential
for abuses. Improper transactions that may be risky fall into two categories. One category involves
transactions that may be profitable to the parent company, but which expose the bank subsidiary to
undue risk of failure. Commonly, a parent company may allow its troubled bank subsidiaries to
misprice business transactions. For example, a bank subsidiary may charge excessively low loan
rates, or transfer assets for book value rather than market value. Similarly, a parent company may
allow its bank subsidiary to declare a high dividend, and then use those funds only for nonbank
operations. The second category involves improper transactions between the bank and nonbank
subsidiary. A parent company may allow its nonbank subsidiaries to make risky loans with a bank
subsidiary or the parent company may overcharge bank subsidiaries for management or data
processing services. Impermissible transactions are not always easy to detect through the regulatory
examination process.
Furthermore, the differing jurisdiction of the regulatory agencies may make a prohibited
transaction even more difficult to uncover. The Federal Reserve Board regulates the parent company
and the nonbank subsidiary, while the acc and the FDIC regulate the bank subsidiary.
In Fitzpatrick v. FDIC, 754 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1985), the FDIC found that there was blatant
abuse of interaffiliate funding which was detectable because the institution was insolvent. The court
also stated that loans from a member bank to its affiliates must be secured by a collateral which is
only met by perfected security interest. Here, the bank director approved loans that exceeded the
lending limits and violated the collateral requirements; the court held that the imposition of a $1,000
civil penalty was not arbitrary and capricious.ld.
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tempt to camouflage or disguise, the restricted transaction. 242 The examination process, however, serves as a notification only after the deleterious conduct has occurred.
The principle question perhaps becomes one of public statutory
policy. A parent company that owns a bank subsidiary is responsible for
maintaining its regulatory capital. The banking statutes have a fixed determination of what constitutes undercapitalization.243 The asset transfers
mandated under the banking statutes draw an imprecise correlation between the undercapitalized subsidiary and interaffiliate transfers. Furthermore, that correlation, arguably, is based on the presumption that
those transfers contributed to a decline of the banking subsidiary's capital~

.

Evaluating the funding needs of the subsidiary that receives the
transfer becomes critical to detennining whether there is abusive conduct
in the use of federal depository funds and balances these concerns regarding pairing the capital infusion with the interaffiliate transactions. 245
To determine if the parent company's decision is in the best interests of
the bank subsidiary making the transfer, the regulations must include an
evaluation of the parent company's conduct at the time of the transaction.
Specifically, when the bank funds are shifted or transferred, there should
be an assessment regarding whether the receiving subsidiary uses them
for investment opportunities or for working capital needs. 246 The evaluation requires the parent company to support its decision to make the
transfer at the time of the transaction. 247 A defensible decision is one in
which the parent company can show that it used low-cost bank funds for
investment purposes.248 A non-defensible decision is one in which the
low-cost bank funds were used for working capital.249 As a matter of routine business analysis, there should be an assesment, perhaps, a stan242. See generally John T. Rose & Samuel H. Talley, Bank Transactions with Affiliates: The
New Section 23A, 100 BANKING L.I. 423 (1983); John T. Rose & Samuel H. Talley, Section 23A of
the Federal Reserve Act: Issues Surrounding FiTllUlcial Transactions Between a Bank and Affiliated
Companies, ISSUES IN BANK REG., Summer 1978, at 8.
243. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994).
244. The Federal Reserve Board's regulatory order requiring the capital infusion does not
identify which interaffiliate transactions have resulted in a decline of the banking subsidiary's
capital. That order simply seeks to restore the fmancial institution's capital adequacy by readjusting
a portion of the banking subsidiary's debt as equity. One such method is to infuse, into the banking
subsidiary, the amount of capital needed to meet the statutory requirement.
245. Under 12 C.F.R. § 250.250, transactions between the bank and nonbank affiliate may be
exempt from rule 23A if three conditions are met: a commitment by the bank prior to the affiliate's
commitment to make the loan, an independent credit evaluation by the bank, and the absence of a
blanket advance commitment by the bank. See 12 C.F.R. § 250.250 (1997). That section has been
interpreted through federal reserve rulings to distinguish the use of funds for investment and working
capital purposes. See Daly, supra note 239, at 608-11.
246. See Daly, supra note 239, at 607.
247. 12 C.F.R. § 250.250(c) (1997).
248. Id.
249. Id.
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dardized range, of the effect on or risk of loss to the subsidiary because
of an interaffiliate transaction. Should the bank subsidiary become insolvent, this analysis should yield a correlation between the bank subsidiary's unprofitable posture and the risky or abusive parent company conduct. The lack of a nexus between the operation of the enterprise and the
default, and insolvency of the bank subsidiary will allow the bankruptcy
trustee to establish that the questioned asset transfer was a fraudulent
conveyance, not a routine business transaction protected from an avoidance action.
A transfer made to satisfy working capital needs should not be subject to an avoidance action under the Code. Whether the transfer is used
as working capital, can be determined by evaluating whether the parent
company has engaged in either beneficial conduct or wrongful conduct.
Beneficial conduct describes the parent company's decision to elect to
describe its corporate operation as an integrated economic enterprise.2SO
This means the parent company acknowledges that it routinely uses the
bank subsidiary assets to maximize the profits and diversify the losses of
the conglomerate. 2SI Moreover, the designation means that the parent
company is willing to use enterprise resources, e.g., nonbank subsidiary
funds, to assist a bank subsidiary that becomes insolvent. 252 Wrongful
conduct describes the appropriate bank agency's determination that the
operation functions as an integrated economic enterprise. The appropriate bank regulator must establish that the parent company though interaffiliate transactions jeopardized the capital of the bank subsidiary. This
requires an assessment of the parent company's conduct to determine the
restrictions on transactions between bank subsidiaries. Specifically, the
bank subsidiary's regulator reviews the parent company's record of interaffiliate transactions to evaluate compliance with the parent company's
internal policies and guidelines. 2S3 Those standards should address how

250. See Cohen, supra note 14.
251. One author argues that holding company level compliance is a more cost-effective means
of complying with FDICIA's increased regulatory and compliance costs. See Cohen, supra note 14.
This model suggests that the parent company makes the capital infusion because it is in the best
interest of the enterprise to keep the bank subsidiary well-capitalized. Id. at 31.
252. This theory is consistent with the investment-backed expectations of investors of a
regulated industry, such as banking. The burden of proof follows the party that elects to make the
determination. The parent company is allowed to make the declaration because it may be in its best
interest not to have the transfer avoided. This situation might arise if, the parent company, at the time
the filing of its bankruptcy petition, has solvent bank subsidiaries. Under the proposed change,
recognition of a pre-bankruptcy parent company asset transfer as valid operates as a credit against a
cross-guaranty assessment made to a solvent bank subsidiary in the same enterprise.
253. These pre-established guidelines and policies are not subject to regulatory approval. See
Daly, supra note 239, at 605. See also Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and Branching Under
the Reigel-Neal Act of 1994, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 183 (1996) (discussing new correspondent
banking rules).
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the parent company evaluates the effect of interaffiliate transactions on a
bank. subsidiary's capital performance.2S4
Enterprise liability seems appropriate when the parent company has
made a decision that creates a material risk of loss to the federal deposit
insurance fund.2SS The banking enterprise exception is premised on the
conglomerate's risky use of federally insured funds as a routine business
practice. Parent company obligation is appropriate in those circumstances where the parent company has engaged in abusive or risky use of
deposit funds within its operation.216 Requiring the parent company to
monitor its own operations is an appropriate policing mechanism. The
parent company becomes responsible for ensuring the reasonable use of
federally insured funds.2S7 The parent company closely regulates its own
conduct determining the effect on the bank. subsidiary.2s8 By carefully
assessing the risk of interaffiliate transactions, a parent company may
decide to avoid certain transactions, restructure others or engage in risky
ones knowing that those could be costly.
The nexus between the interaffiliate transfers and the bank. subsidiary's decline is implicitly articulated by the banking regulatory

254. The parent company is allowed to make the declaration because it may be in its best
interest not to have the transfer avoided. This situation might arise if, at the time the filing of its
bankruptcy petition, the parent company has solvent bank subsidiaries. Under the proposed change,
recognition of a pre-bankruptcy parent company asset transfer as valid operates as a credit against a
cross-guaranty assessment made to a solvent bank subsidiary in the same enterprise. See discussion
infra Part V.C.
In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Comms. Corp .• 1991 WL 277613, at *1, *34
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), Chancellor Allen ruled that directors of a corporation that is in the vicinity
of insolvency have an obligation to creditors as well as shareholders. The "vicinity of insolvency"
issue is germane to this discussion because the requirement that the parent company make a
judgment in the best interests of the bank subsidiary defines the parent company's fiduciary duty on
behalf of the subsidiary in a way that also creates a fiduciary obligation to the insurance fund as a
creditor.
255. See discussion of cross-guarantee provision supra note 241. Limited liability protects
related corporations from collective responsibility for fmancial losses. Corporate law disregards
limited liability only if the holding company system is using the corporate structure as a veil or sham
for other fraudulent business. See generally Christopher W. Frost, Organizational Form.
Misappropriation Risk. and the Substantive Consolidation of Corporate Groups, 44 HASTINGS L. 1.
449 (1993); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts. 100 YALE L.1. 1879 (1991); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of
the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REv. 80 (1991).
256. See Havard, supra note 33, at 2363-64.
257. In an earlier piece, I posited that an alternative means for securing the capital infusion
needed for a troubled bank of a multi-bank holding company system-temporary consolidation of
the fmancial institutions in the holding company structure. I proposed factors that the FDIC should
apply to determine whether the subsidiaries in the multi-bank: holding fail to have separate economic
identities. Such a fmding would result in a temporary suspension of the charter in order for
consolidation to occur./d. at 2399, 2408-10.
258. See Gouvin, supra note 151, at 351-53 (arguing that the effect of such parent company or
shareholder monitoring results in an overzealousness by the regulatory agencies to protect the
insurance fund to the disadvantage of the private market and the self-policing of those shareholders).
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structure.259 The correlation, evidenced in the prompt corrective action
provision, values the tangible and intangible benefits of bank holding
company affiliation. 260 Furthermore, that regulatory-permmissible asset
transfer incorporates a legitimate business responsibility: the pooling of
funds to meet the bank subsidiary's safety and soundness concems.261
Thus, the parent company's decision to shore up its bank subsidiary
ought to be immune from attack by its own shareholders.
C. Economical Use of the Parent Company's Resources
An asset transfer or capital infusion that reduces the debtor parent
company's estate ought to be unavoidable in limited circumstances.262
Viewing the exchange as one made within the collective conglomerate
warrants valuing the capital infusion as payment for a prior liability, an
improperly capitalized interaffiliate transaction. 263 Satisfying the banking
enterprise exception measures the transfer's value to the conglomerate
operation. Viewing the conglomerate collectively also supports the argument that the insurance fund's equitable interest is greater than that of
the debtor parent company's estate. The payment is a cost of doing business, or a decision that the parent company made well before the transfer
actually occurred.
Recognizing the asset transfer as a valid pre-petition obligation prevents the costs of interaffiliate transfers from being shifted to the FDIC. 264
The downstream contribution is another decision to shift losses or maximize profits within the groUp.265 The banking enterprise exception ex-

259. This policy choice operates even when the parent company has become insolvent because
the parent and subsidiary corporations are a single operation based on the realities of their corporate
financial structure. See Blumberg, supra note 227, at 308-10.
260. Havard, supra note 33, at 2686-88.
261. Bankruptcy law uses substantive consolidation to join the resources of related corporations
to enlarge the debtor's estate to satisfy the claims of creditors. Blumberg, supra note 227, at 328-29.
See also John C. Deal, et ai, Capital Punishment: The Death of Limited Liability for Shareholders of
Federally Regulated Financial Institutions, 24 CAP. U. L. REv. 67, 129 (1995).
262. The Federal Reserve's regulatory order based on the source of strength doctrine does not
identify which interaffiliate transactions have resulted in the decline of the banking subsidiary's
capital. That order simply seeks to restore the fmancial institution's capital adequacy by readjusting
a portion of the banking subsidiary's debt as equity, e.g. infuse the amount of capital into the
banking subsidiary needed to meet the statutory requirement. FDIC IMPROVEMENT Aer, H.R. No.
103-330, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1901, 1917-1935.
263. This policy choice operates even when the parent company has become insolvent because
the parent and subsidiary corporations are a single operation based on the realities of their corporate
financial structure. See Havard, supra note 33, at 2409-10.
264. Emeric Fischer, Banking & Insurance-Shauld Ever the Twain Meet? 71 NEB. L. REv.
726,771 (1992).
265. Three types of intercorporate guarantees exist: (1) a guarantee by a parent corporation or
principal shareholder of a subsidiary's debt (a "downstream" guarantee); (2) a guarantee by a
subsidiary of its parent's or principal shareholder's debt (an "upstream" guarantee); and (3) a
guarantee by a corporation of an affiliated corporation's debt (a "cross-stream" guarantee). See
generally Phillip I. Blumberg, Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-stream, and Downstream) Guaranties
Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 685 (1987).
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tends enterprise liability to the parent company's decision to fund an
insolvent bank subsidiary.266 To the extent that the parent company has
engaged in the beneficial use of the bank subsidiary's deposit funds, its
decision to pool enterprise resources to strengthen its financial condition
is a protected business judgment. 267 The funding needs and uses of the
bank subsidiary are justifiable diversions of group finances.
The questioned asset transfer should withstand an attack alleging
violation of the business judgment rule because of the industry practice
allowing bank holding companies to engage in inter-affiliate transactions. The fmancial decline of the bank subsidiary has several attendant
losses. The reputation of the enterprise suffers if the bank subsidiary
fails. 268 The interdependent bank and nonbank businesses deteriorate. 269
The business practices of the particular bank holding company demonstrates the frequency of the transactions within that enterprise. The nature
of the relationship between the parent company and the bank subsidiary,
prior to bankruptcy, ought to make the parent company's decision less
vulnerable to shareholders' attack. 270
D. Limiting the FDIC-Receiver's Function
The FDIC-Receiver has been highly successful in defending challenges brought by the trustee regarding the exercise of its discretionary
powers. Arguably, Congress has camouflaged which body of law
"trumps" or controls the procedural jurisdiction of the debtor parent
company. A reasoned approach suggests that the two statutory schemes
share the grant of jurisdiction.271 By carefully parsing the statutory language, it appears that Congress has created equitable remedies that are
congruent. The bank regulatory agencies are not subject to the automatic
266. Lissa Lamkin Broome, Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges to Limited
Liability in the Bank Holding Company Structure, 26 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 935,987 (1993).
267. See Gouvin, supra note 1; see also Partricia A. Mccoy, The Notional Business Judgment
Rule in Banking, 44 CATH. V. L. REv. 1031 (1995); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties'
Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 175 (1995); Mark David Wallace, Life in the Boardroom after F1RREA: A
Revisionist Approach to Corporate Governance in Insured Depository Institutions, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1187 (1992).
268. See Garten, supra note 14, at 371.
269. Id. at 362.
270. The interbank liabilities regulation which requires a bank to develop internal policies and
procedures to control exposure in correspondent banking relationships provide bank directors with a
safe harbor for the implementation of those policies. 12 U .S.C. § 250 (1994).
271. The Code's automatic stay provision does not address its interaction with FIRREA's bar
of judicial intervention. The Second Circuit distinguished MCorp in In re Colonial Realty Co. v.
Hirsch, 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992), fmding that there was no section 362 exemption available to
the FDIC-receiver because the FDIC was suing for damages and recovery of property. The court
reasoned that the debtor retains no legal or equitable interest in fraudulently'transferred property.
Thus holding that the automatic stay applied to the FDIC-receiver's efforts to exercise its powers to
avoid asset transfers. In re Colonial Realty Co. v. Hirsch, 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992); Carroll v.
Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd., 903 F. 2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1990).
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stay because the stay occurs by operation of law.172 The language of section 18210) prohibits a court from interfering with the powers and duties
of the receiver. Yet, section 362, the automatic stay provision, does not
require court action. Instead, the stay is merely activated to control litigation involving the debtor. 273 Therefore, since the stay is self-operating,
it literally entails no court action, and thus, results in no violation of the
anti-injunction power of the receiver under section 18210).
This interpretation, however, would require the FDIC-Receiver to
pursue its claims, such as funding a capital maintenance obligation,
against the debtor in the bankruptcy court, as suggested by the MCorp
decision. This concurrent jurisdiction, applicable only to final agency
actions, would result in the bankruptcy court's exercising final relief to
the claims of the FDIC-Receiver.274 The question then becomes whether
the existing bankruptcy scheme provides an unacceptable frustration of
the FDIC-Receiver's efforts to resolve the failure of an insolvent banle In
the terms of this article, the question becomes whether the claims process
should govern the trustee's claims against FDIC-Corporate for fraudulent
conveyances.
The receiver's grant of jurisdiction should not be equivalent to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in this context. The existing bank insolvency scheme invests the receiver with a dual status: successor and adjudicator. Not only is the receiver a fiduciary of the failed institution's assets for the protection 9f the creditors, the receiver is also a judge of the
merits of those creditors' claims. This intrinsic conflict of interest requires a fairer process.275 By enacting the banking exception, Congress
could provide creditors with an objective, preliminary review of claims. 276
The FDIC-Corporate receives priority status as an unsecured creditor whenever it must contribute funds due to a fmancial institution's insolvency.277 Unsecured creditors receive the liquidation value of their

272. Richard F. Hewitt, Jr., In Re Landmark Land Co.: A Landmark Roadblockfor Bankruptcy
Courts v. Federal Regulators?, 45 S.c. L. REV. 68, 78-79 (1993); J. Van Oliver & John Sparacino,
Chapter 11 and Financial Institutions: Super Powers and Super Problems for Banks, Regulators and
Bank Holding Companies, in Banking Law Series 1993 at 197 (PLI Comm. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 651,1993).
273. In re Colonial Realty Co., 980 F.2d at 137.
274. Roy C. Snodgrass, ill & Shawna L. Johannsen, Banking Law, 46 S.M.U. L. REv. 935,
947-48 (1993).
275. See supra Part IT.B.2. (discussion of administrative and judicial review of receiver's
determination of claims).
276. As in the present bankruptcy scheme, a creditor could appeal to the appropriate federal
district court for a review of the bankruptcy court's decision. See supra Part V.c.
277. The FDIC-receiver (receiver) usually chooses between two resolution methods. The
receiver may choose to liquidate the failed institution and distribute the proceeds to creditors. See 12
U.S.c. § 1821(d)(2)(E) (1994). Or, the receiver may sell all or a portion of the failed institution to a
healthy institution using a purchase and assumption transaction. § 1821(d)(2)(G) (1994). FIRREA
requires that the FDIC use the "least costly alternative."12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1994).
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claims. Assumed creditors may receive full satisfaction of their claims.278
The FDIC-Receiver decides whether to allow or disallow all claims, including secured and unsecured priority claims. The receiver's disallowance of a claim precludes judicial review of that claim.l79
Both the Code and FIRREA are concerned with fair distribution and
timely resolution of creditors' claims. Both the receiver and the bankruptcy court have a specialized expertise in winding up the affairs of
failed businesses and entities. Both have a state policy objective of ensuring unity in that procedure. Although invested with similar powers
and jurisdiction, neither is an expert at the other's job. The insolvency of
a parent company that has made an asset transfer or capital maintenance
payments in the year preceding its insolvency requires the skill of both.
Concurrent jurisdiction, to the extent that it directs a consistent,
equitable review of such a claim, would resolve the dormant conflict.
Both the bankruptcy court and the receiver should have jurisdiction to
review de novo the claim by a parent company or its trustee that the
transfer of funds to the bank subsidiary should be avoided. Other procedural matters should also be uniform, namely, the time deadlines for filing and the opportunity to appeal to the district court for a review of the
determination.
The grant of jurisdiction to both the bankruptcy court and the banking receiver should be limited to a determination of the amount, not the
validity of the claim. Both should be charged with evaluating the particular claim as it fits into the failure resolution process. Accordingly, if
the FDIC has filed a cross-guarantee assessment, the capital maintenance
obligation should operate as a "credit" against that liability. The Federal
Reserve or OTS, the holding company regulators, would be responsible
for filing a statement of outstanding liability whenever a parent company
becomes bankrupt. This statement would document the outstanding liability under the guarantee plan as well as a schedule of past payments.

278. See 12 u.s.c. § 1821(i)(2)-(3) (1994). The supplemental payments come from the Bank
Insurance Fund, if the failed institution is a bank and from Savings Association Insurance Fund
(SAIF) if the failed institution is an S & L. 12 U.S.c. § 1823(e) (1994).
279. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(E) (1994). To be proven, a claim must (1) be in writing, (2) have
been executed contemporaneously by the depository institution and the claimant, (3) be approved by
the board of directors or the loan committee of the institution and reflected in the minutes, and (4)
have been kept continuously as an official record of the institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1994).
For claims proven to the receiver's satisfaction, FJRREA allows a claimant to seek
administrative or judicial review within 60 days of the receiver's determination of the claim or 180
days of the date that the FDIC was appointed receiver, whichever is shorter. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6).
FIRREA also directs the FDIC to establish procedures for expedited determination of time-sensitive
claims as well as "low cost" and "expeditious" alternative dispute resolution procedures. Id. See
Note, Unsecured Creditors of Failed Banks: It's Not a Wonderful Life, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1052,
1067-71 (1991) (arguing that FIRREA's liability limit provisions are an unnecessary power of the
receiver, allowing the receiver to limit, arguably, parent company claims, given the cross-guarantee
provision).
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The receiver would have the responsibility of detennining whether there
has been compliance with the guarantee and providing the bankruptcy
court with a certification of the amount of the offset against crossguarantee liability.
To the extent that a parent company seeks to have the bankruptcy
court provide equitable relief, the bankruptcy court should be barred. The
operation of the automatic stay would unfairly forestall the resolution of
a claim. The parent company ought to be estopped from challenging
capital maintenance payments in the bankruptcy scheme. Allowing equitable relief at this juncture sanctions a detrimental change to the creditors of the bank subsidiary.
The assumption of a capital maintenance obligation by the parent
company provides a basis for bankruptcy court jurisdiction because there
is no issue about the enforceability of the obligation. A parent company's
decision to recapitalize its bank subsidiary resolves the finality issue under the administrative process. In particular, the parent company that
contests an obligation is challenging the amount, not the validity, of the
obligation. 280
The bank regulatory agencies have defended the claims against
fraudulent conveyance by arguing that the transfers were made pursuant
to valid regulatory orders.281 This argument sanctions the transfers recapitalizing the bank subsidiary as a means of enforcing safe and sound
banking practice. 282 However, without the banking exception as a predicate, this argument fails. The good faith exception cannot support a claim
based merely on exercising the requisite authority. Even given valid
regulatory orders, the exemption, under a traditional analysis, requires
that the transferee show an exchange for value. In a parent-subsidiary
relationship, that exchange requires solvency. Without the banking exception, the bankruptcy court, when called upon to review the receiver's
detennination, would not be able to sustain its decision based on valid
exercise of regulatory authority.
Moreover, when there is an outstanding capital maintenance obligation, and the bank subsidiary and parent company become insolvent, the
receiver files a proof of claim to recover the outstanding debt; the trustee
files to recover past payments. In essence, because of the outstanding
obligation, the parent company's estate is a debtor of the receivership. If
the parent company's estate must satisfy any unfunded capital mainte-

280. A parent company that is funding a capital maintenance obligation pursuant to the prompt
corrective action provision, presumably, is not contesting the legitimacy of the obligation in the
same manner that bank holding companies did under the source of strength or the net worth
maintenance theories. See supra Part m.c.
281. See supra Part lilA (discussing BNE's trustee claims that transfers were fraudulent
conveyances).
282. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i».
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nance obligation as a prerequisite to reorganization,28J the parent company's status to the receivership may not require compliance with
FIRREA's administrative claims process.284 Yet, if the claim is resolved
in the bankruptcy court, it may be disallowed, creating an unfair disadvantage for the creditors of the bank subsidiary .285
VI. CONCLUSION
Undergirding the body of banking laws are policies that Congress
has adopted in order to protect the safety and soundness of the nation's
banking system, including the taxpayer funded insurance fund. This system of federal regulation of the nation's financial institutions. requires a
parent company to either maintain the capital adequacy of its bank subsidiary or relinquish control. The effect of this obligation is to shore up
the financial institution's capital and, in case of its failure, to decrease the
amount that FDIC-Corporate must pay to insured depositors. A dormant
conflict of policy and of law ensues when a parent company that has
made the asset transfer also becomes insolvent. The formal priority
scheme of the Code, designed to treat all creditors equally, clashes with
the banking law's preferential treatment of the insurance fund as an unsecured creditor. The conflict raises a specific issue: When a bank holding company becomes a debtor after making an asset transfer pursuant to
regulatory authority, can that transfer fmd protection in the bankruptcy
scheme?
Although this conflict appears to beg the question as to which body
of law should control, a closer examination of the banking laws reveals
that Congress has made that choice. While recognizing bankruptcy's dual
goals of protecting the debtor and ensuring equal treatment of all creditors, Congress, through the established cradle to grave regulation of financial institutions has given the public creditor-the insurance fundmore protection than any single private creditor.
Congress must fill the gap between its articulated policy choices and
its existing legislation. A consistent regulatory scheme requires amending the current bankruptcy regime to protect from avoidance any asset
transfer made by a now debtor parent company to its insolvent bank subsidiary. The provision would parallel the requirements of the Bankruptcy

283. See supra Part m.c (discussing 12 U.S.c. § 365(0)).
284. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)).
285. The trustee can thus prove the preference and, because the dividend is highly unlikely to
result in payment of the claim in fulI, the FDIC's claim cannot be alIowed. As those things go, not
too bad a result for the estate. Another court has held in this situation that, by filing a proof of claim
for the balance of the debt, the RTC availed itself of the privileges of the bankruptcy court, and that
section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code created an independent ground for bankruptcy court
jurisdiction. Richard F. Broude, The Unstoppable Force Meets the Immoveable Object: FIRREA and
the Bankruptcy Code, in 17TH ANN. CURRENT DEVS. IN BANKR. & REORGANIZATION at 559 & 57273 (PLI Comm. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 715,1995).
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Code's good faith exception to the fraudulent conveyance provision by
creating a separate exception for a banking enterprise asset transfer. Specifically, Congress should legislate procedures that banking regulators
must comply with befpre requiring a debtor parent company to make
asset transfers to a bank subsidiary. If the requirements of the exception
are met, the assets supporting the transfer would be immune from an
avoidance action. Legally, such a proposal may be the only way that the
FDIC may avoid the fraudulent conveyance provision.
As in the BNEC bankruptcy proceedings, a bankruptcy trustee, in
exercising its fiduciary obligation to distribute the estate for the benefit
of all creditors, has an obligation to seek to avoid the transfer. Without a
legislative change, a court reviewing the asset transfer must return it to
the estate of the debtor for the benefit of the creditors. The concomitant
result will be that a parent company that is not itself extremely well
capitalized will be unwilling to make a capital infusion at all, particularly
since that parent company also may face claims that its decision to shore
up a capital-weakened bank subsidiary is violative of the business judgment rule.
Congress undoubtedly did not mean to discourage parent companies
from making capital infusions. It may not have envisioned that a parent
company that chooses to do so may itself become insolvent. The banking
enterprise exception provides a basis for the asset transfer. It merges the
two statutory schemes by balancing the policy interests of the two regulatory schemes while allowing the parent company to define its fair obligation to its capital-weakened bank subsidiary. FIRREA's seeming prohibition against judicial intervention and the Code's silence on the issue
underscore the need for a more definitive approach that addresses the
scope of administrative jurisdiction when a parent company with an outstanding capital maintenance obligation has filed for the protections of
the bankruptcy process.

